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Abstract
Paul Federn was an important figure in the early development of psychoanalysis. He was,
besides Sigmund Freud himself, the only founding member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic
Society who was still a member when the society was disbanded by the Nazis in 1938. He was
also an early pioneer in the use of psychoanalysis toward the understanding and treatment of
psychosis, and was among the very first to consider the importance of the ego to psychoanalytic
understanding of the mind and mental illness. This dissertation examines Federn’s key ideas,
ego-feeling and ego-boundaries, their influence on later psychoanalytic formulations by
Winnicott, Lewin, Isakower, Loewald, Anzieu and others, and their practical use in
understanding clinical material, the psychoanalytic setting and in organizing and understanding
the various forms of therapeutic action.
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Chapter One: Paul Federn

At the earliest ending of winter,
In March, a scrawny cry from outside
Seemed like a sound in his mind…
The sun was rising at six,
No longer a battered panache above snow...
It would have been outside.
It was not from the vast ventriloquism
Of sleep's faded papier-mache...
The sun was coming from the outside.
... It was like
A new knowledge of reality.
“Not Ideas About the Thing, But the Thing Itself” Wallace Stevens (1954, p. 534)

I was the chief military commander and the chief statesman of great territories, and I put
in order one province after the other. In the dream I knew which country, far in the east, it
was…
The principle of wish fulfillment is overt. Everything is in full contrast to reality. In
reality, I was sitting incapable of moving and—as I mentioned—my attitude was particularly
obedient and without resistance...Equally noticeable was the contrast between my role in the
dream and the reality of my actual life. An exile can but watch contemporary events and criticize
what happens; he cannot defend himself, his family or his interests.
Paul Federn, “A Dream Under General Anesthesia” (1946, p.102)

The story of Paul Federn is ultimately a story about dislocation. It is a story about a
placeless subject, alienated from his culture and language, and even from his own self and body.
Traumatic dislocation is a biographical fact of Federn’s life, and also the unifying theme of his
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entire theoretical and clinical contribution to psychoanalysis. At the most basic level, Federn’s
assertion is that when we say the word “I,” we are not nearly as certain about what we mean as
we would like to think. Even if we are able to muster up some intellectual facts or tell a story
about who this person is, feeling ourselves to be stably located within this “I” (which, to make
matters more complicated, is partly but not totally synonymous with a body), is another matter
entirely. And even if we are able to find that feeling of “I-ness”, that “ego-feeling,” as Federn
terms it, maintaining it is a perpetual and costly challenge.
In a century (and now well into a second) that manufactured untold millions of refugees,
of people traumatized, dislocated, alienated, and in some sense psychologically lost, this is
hardly unfamiliar territory. Nor is it unfamiliar to describe a corresponding internal dislocation.
The unstable or centerless self seems a common story of both modernism and post-modernism.
On the optimistic end, it is an opportunity, it is the “I” that is an invention, a construction, a story
we tell ourselves, our “center of narrative gravity” (1992, p. 275) as the neurophilosopher Daniel
Dennett phrased it, an “I” that in Walt Whitman’s ecstatic proclamation “contain[s] multitudes”
(1855, p. 95). But we are also well familiar now with the trauma associated with this, the
moments when our center of narrative gravity cannot hold, when we seem to lose ourselves or
perhaps, as our story of pathological narcissism goes, to be desperately and endlessly in search of
ourselves, in love with ourselves as a perfect thing we had and lost. And so Federn’s story
fittingly and tragically ends in America, a country well associated with the self-made man, or the
self as an invention, perhaps most recently evoked in the television series Mad Men (Weiner,
2007-2015), with both its exhilarations and attendant loneliness.
Federn’s predominant focus is when this dislocation is not a philosophical stance but a
psychological experience. This experience happens as both an ordinary and pathological
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occurrence, as much a feature of psychosis and traumatic depersonalization as it is of dreams and
the moments between sleep and waking. Such states are well represented in the art and literature
of modernism. The Wallace Stevens poem “Not Ideas About the Thing But The Thing Itself”
(1954 p. 534) takes places in the mind of a person halfway between sleep and waking when “a
scrawny cry outside/seemed like a sound in his mind.” Trying to locate himself, the speaker of
the poem states “The sun was rising at six/ no longer a battered panache above snow…/it would
have been outside,” and then, finally certain, he states “It was not from the vast ventriloquism/
Of sleep’s faded papier mache…/ the sun was coming from outside.” This moment of drawing
the boundaries between dream thoughts and waking reality, inside and outside, imaginary and
real--of demarcating where one’s mind begins and ends-- is the largely unconscious work that
Federn claims is constantly occurring within us, work that is difficult, at times exhausting, and at
which we are never as good as we think we are.
And yet, this was not a story that psychoanalysis, that most modernist of inventions,
found a way to tell easily. While Freud’s entire contribution of the unconscious casts doubt on
who or what exactly this “I” is, by the time American psychoanalysis came into its own, the “I,”
or Freud’s Ich, had become “the ego,” a reified, specific agency in the mind, completely distinct
from the more holistic idea of “the self” (Kelen, 1990, p. 52). To the extent that such a thing
existed, self-experience was, as far as post-war ego psychology was concerned, one of many
functions of the ego (Hartman, 1950, p. 80 ). Self-experience (or self-representation) was the
movie, the ego was the movie projector. The existence of the ego could largely be taken for
granted, even if its ability to function could be seriously taxed by a harsh superego, rigid and
possibly primitive defenses or persecutory anxieties--or by maladaptive compromise formations.
If something was wrong with the movie, one might say there were real problems with the
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functioning of the projector, but the projector was always there as a fixed entity. In this context,
Federn was contributing what still may seem a radical assertion: that movie creates the projector
as much as the projector creates the movie. The only controversy was whether his theory was
outdated or simply idiosyncratic (Steiner, 1989, 173 ; Makari, 2008, p. 474).
But in the following generations, with the proliferation of ideas such as the “false self”
(Winnicott, 1960, p.140), “thoughts without a thinker” (Bion, 1967, p.117), renewed discussion
of de-cathexis (Green, 1975, p.17), or “identity” (de M’Uzan, 2018, p. 132), the individual ego
that could not be taken for granted became somewhat more of a mainstream idea, even if
expressed in highly various terminologies. One could therefore easily make the argument that
Federn was not only behind his times but was also, by some strange paradox, significantly ahead.
And yet, with the notable exception of Didier Anzieu (1989, p. 94), that argument was not made,
and Federn’s work was largely forgotten.
This is therefore a story not only of dislocation, but also of what gets lost in translation.
But in re-engaging with Federn as a psychoanalyst whose ideas have been lost in translation, we
also come to see how much of Freud was lost. As a member of the first generation of Freudian
psychoanalysts, Federn likely shouldered the nearly impossible task of living in the vast shadow
of Freud while remaining himself and allowing his psychoanalytic work to be shaped by his own
thinking and his own clinical experience. As the only founding member of the Vienna
Psychoanalytic Society who was still a member in 1938 when it was disbanded by the Nazis (E.
Federn, 1990, p.125), one can make the argument that Federn was uniquely able to do this
successfully, though imperfectly. As such, the reader of Federn stands to benefit from two gifts
for the price of one. Every discovery of Federn’s is simultaneously a unique idea based on close
clinical observation, but also a profound personal condensation of some of the most essential
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Freudian ideas. Thus, to discover Federn is, in some inextricable way, to discover Freud, and
perhaps a different Freud from the one many of us have been introduced to.

Paul Federn
Paul Federn was born into a Jewish family in Vienna in 1871, and died in New York City
in 1950. He became a doctor in 1895, and, by 1904, after reading The Interpretation of Dreams,
became an important early follower of Freud (Makari, p. 153). During World War 1, Federn
served as a physician on the front (Federn, 1944, p. 97). Federn’s thirty-five years of affiliation
with Freud are unparalleled by any other psychoanalyst. During his time in Vienna, Federn had
established a reputation as an unorthodox but brilliant analyst. In one of few portraits of Federn
as a clinician, his son, Ernst Federn, portrayed his father as a psychoanalyst with an interest in
non-neurotic and poor patients, one particularly interested in modifying classical technique to
work with such patients and also in developing the social and societal infrastructure in which
such rehabilitation could happen. Although unfailingly loyal to Freud—personally and to what
Federn believed to be the core of Freud’s theory—Federn’s major area of clinical interest was
with patients and diagnoses that had occupied less of Freud’s clinical interest. At a time when
few would treat psychotic and severely ill patients even in a hospital, Federn treated them in his
home, and would work with the patients’ families to help them provide the necessary care and
coverage. This included treating cases that were deemed hopeless, and often for little or no
charge. Federn was involved in local politics, and worked as district councilman with an interest
in implementing social welfare programs. He was also a member of the board of The Settlement
House, in Vienna, a home for juvenile delinquents, and Federn supervised (as well as analyzed)
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August Aichhorn, the first psychoanalyst to treat adolescent delinquents, in the development of
his theory and technique (E. Federn, 1962, p. 125).
Federn was an important, if at times complicated, presence in the psychoanalytic world of
prewar Vienna. As a senior member, Federn was tasked with a number of administrative and
leadership roles within the society. Despite accounts of his generosity and gentleness as a teacher
and clinician (Weiss, 1952, p.2), other accounts describe Federn as presiding over the meetings
of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in a frightening and authoritarian way (Makari, 2008, 476).
Federn was simultaneously viewed by others being too loyal to Freud, as well as to
having an approach to theory and technique that was not sufficiently Freudian. Because of his
zeal for Freud’s ideas, he was given the nickname “the Apostle Paul,” (Housier, Blanc, et al,
2016, p. 253) by others in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Nevertheless, Federn seemed to
have the tendency to “develop his own views on some important theoretical issues, without
realizing exactly how his views were considered by the Freudian establishment” (Steiner, 1988,
p.335).
This contradiction of Federn being seen as “the Apostle Paul” of Freudian psychoanalysis
and simultaneously an idiosyncratic analyst whose work fell outside of the mainstream paradigm
is key to understanding both the historical reaction and what his theory now can offer us now. An
engagement with Federn brings us back to Freud, particularly the Freud of the “middle period,”
but also seems to point to a number of contemporary concerns in our own time, with ego-feeling
resembling notions both inside and outside of psychoanalysis, such as self-states (Bromberg,
1996), mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 2015), embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2019), mentalization
(Fonagy, Gergley & Jurist, 2018), mentalized affectivity (Jurist, 2005), and reflective function
(Fonagy & Target, 1997).
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Despite these complications, Federn was also seen as an influential member of the society
and a gifted analyst. When Freud became ill during the summer of 1924, he left the running of
the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society to Anna Freud and Paul Federn (Perlman, 1999, p. 2). Among
Federn’s direct pupils and analysands were Aichhorn (E. Federn, p.129), Edoardo Weiss, the
founder of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society (Roazen 2017, p. 15) and the first analyst to coin
the term “projective identification” (Greenberg, 2018, p. 981), and Otto Isakower, a gifted and
influential Viennese analyst who influenced generations of analysts at the New York
Psychoanalytic Institute after he left Europe during the war (Brown, 2013, p. 29). Heisaku
Kosawa, a Japanese doctor who went to Vienna to study with Freud, was supervised by Federn,
and went on to found the Japan Psychoanalytic Society (Okonogi, 2009, p. 154). Federn’s
influence from afar was also noted by Donald Winnicott, who wrote to him in 1949 (Rodman
1999, p. 12). In the letter, Winnicott asked him for a copy of his lectures on psychosis, which he
mentioned having read and “greatly enjoyed” previously, and thanked him for his comments on
an early paper he had written. The similarities between Winnicott’s and Federn’s work will be
explored in Chapter 3.
After great reluctance, Federn fled to New York in 1938 to escape the Nazis. His adult
son, Ernst was captured and sent to Buchenwald (Weiss, 1951, p. 1), where, by coincidence, be
met and befriended Bruno Bettelheim (E. Federn, 1990, p. 3), an experience the two would later
reflect on together in an interview. Ernst Federn would eventually return to Vienna and reintroduce psychoanalysis into Austrian society after the war. He is considered a pioneer in
Europe of psychoanalytic social work.
Paul Federn encountered significant professional difficulties upon his arrival in New
York. The first wave of émigré analysts were not exactly made to feel welcome in American
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psychoanalysis, as the American-born analysts were quite ambivalent about the prospect of have
their positions of authority usurped by European analysts who carried more legitimacy, while the
few European-trained analysts that were already there often made use of their distance from
Vienna to substantially change (or “modernize”) aspects of Freudian theory. Shortly after
arriving, Federn ran into substantial difficulty by publicly disagreeing with Sandor Rado. Federn
spoke after a well-received speech by Rado, in which he argued for the necessity of freeing
psychoanalytic ideas from what he referred to as “European metaphysics” such as Freud’s
instinct theory. Federn, who had run the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society under
Freud, and had not incurred the nickname “the Apostle Paul” by accident, was no doubt shocked
and appalled by this brashness; after three and a half decades of carefully trying to calibrate his
own thinking around Freud’s, it is likely he truly found himself in strange territory. Federn got
up to the podium and angrily (but in a thick accent that made him difficult to understand)
criticized Rado’s abandonment of Freudian metapsychology. Rado later accused Federn of
having dishonestly doctored the transcript after the argument to make his response sound more
eloquent, only to later find out that the secretary, who had not been able to understand Federn,
had asked for a summary in writing. This incident no doubt caused Federn some difficulty, as
Rado was the president of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute at the time (Makari, 2008,
477).
Thus, Federn found himself in a very new world, and found little respect for his
experience, seniority, or lifetime of service to Freud and to psychoanalysis. In the New York that
Federn arrived in during the late 1930’s (and this became increasingly the case in the coming two
decades) several groups of younger psychoanalysts were arriving at a revised Freudian theory,
feeling that they had to take psychoanalysis towards the future, and to free it from the stifling
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Viennese orthodoxy of the older analysts—of which Federn was the embodiment (Makari, 2008,
p. 477). But the politics working against Federn also went far beyond training institutes.
European medical licenses from before 1914 were not accepted in the United States, so Federn
was unable to join the New York Psychoanalytic Society for the first eight years of his life in
America (E. Federn, 1990, p.175). Federn therefore practiced and wrote in relative isolation and
obscurity until 1946, when he was finally allowed to join the New York Psychoanalytic Society.
Despite the professional marginalization, Federn became a part of a loosely knit and arguably
mutually influencing circle of analysts which included Theodor Reik, Bertram Lewin, Otto
Isakower, and Robert Waelder. Federn taught informal seminars as part of this group and within
the proto-institutes and study groups that Reik was beginning to form. Among the students that
he had at that time was Martin Bergmann (Bergmann, 2000, p. 10).
Following a decade in which he had been forced to flee his home, his son had spent seven
years in Buchenwald, and his wife passed away, he experienced a decline from being in Freud’s
inner circle in Vienna to professional marginalization in New York, and the return of a likely
incurable cancer, Paul Federn committed suicide in 1950 at the age of 79 (Weiss, 1966, p. 1).
The extent to which Federn remains a present absence in psychoanalysis can be
experienced literally with a visit to the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, where his
membership file is still on record, and a photograph of him as an older man looking pensively at
an off-angle to the camera sits above a shelf of reference books in the ground floor library. For
70 years analytic candidates have participated in classes in the “boardroom” on the 3rd floor of
the institute, under the watchful eye of a painting, the only extant image of an adult Sigmund
Freud without a beard. The portrait was commissioned by Federn as a gift to Freud, but Freud
did not like it, and Federn kept it. In his will, he left the portrait to the New York Psychoanalytic
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Society (personal correspondence with psychoanalyst and historian Nellie Thompson). In some
sense, this seems a fitting metaphor to the extent to which Federn’s influence is hidden in plain
sight, ready to reveal a Freud we may not have been familiar with.

Federn and Freud
Federn and Freud likely had a complicated relationship. As we have established, Federn
exhibited such an earnest loyalty to Freud that it became a source of parody, but ended up,
despite his best intentions, with his own ideas. It seems indisputable that Freud trusted Federn
with important tasks involving clinical work and the running of the society. Freud certainly
trusted Federn as a loyal foot soldier, and evidence from letters seems to show that he trusted
Federn as a competent analyst. As early as 1907, Freud described a treatment by Federn as being
“brilliantly successful” in a letter to Jung (Freud 1907, p. 99). In 1909, discussing referrals with
Jung, he described Federn as being “the most congenial and competent to deal with human
problems” (Freud 1909, p. 204). But by the time Federn had come into his own in the 1920’s
with his own approach to the ego and clinical work with psychosis, his attitude towards Federn’s
ideas seems to have been best described by Anna Freud as “passive”(Steiner, 1988, p. 173),
neither explicitly disagreeing with them nor enthusiastically endorsing them.
But the questions that occupied Federn and eventually divided him from the mainstream
of American psychoanalysis were ones that occupied Freud as well. In the very beginning of
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud begins with considering a correspondence with a
“friend” (Freud reveals this friend to be the Nobel Prize winning French writer Romain Rolland)
who states that religious experience
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consists in a peculiar feeling, which never leaves him personally, which he finds shared by many
others, and which he may suppose millions more also experience. It is a feeling which he would
like to call a sensation of eternity, a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded, something
oceanic. It is, he says, a purely subjective experience, not an article of belief; it implies no
assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source of the religious spirit… (p. 23)
While this particular viewpoint about religion came from Rolland, it is very much a line of
thought that defines the work of Federn. Citing Federn’s work “of 1926, 1927 and later” as well
as Ferenczi’s paper “The Development of a Sense of Reality” (1913) in a footnote, Freud writes
of the lack of fixity in the ego’s boundaries.
Normally there is nothing we are more certain of than the feeling of our self, our own ego. It
seems to us an independent unitary thing, sharply outlined against everything else. That this is a
deceptive appearance, and that on the contrary the ego extends inwards without any sharp
delimitation, into an unconscious mental entity which we call the id and to which it forms a
facade, was first discovered by psycho-analytic research, and the latter still has much to tell us
about the relations of the ego to the id…So the ego’s cognizance of itself is subject to
disturbance, and the boundaries between it and the outer world are not immovable. (p. 24)
In the ideas presented here, with which Freud begins one of his last and most ambitious works,
the direct influence on Freud of Federn’s paper “Some Variations in Ego Feeling” (1926) is
apparent. What also becomes apparent are the outlines of where Federn’s thinking will extend
from Freud’s. These considerations about the fact that ego-feeling is a subjective experience and
that neither its boundaries nor its continuity can be taken for granted, were the major focus of
Federn’s life’s work. But this moves the focus of psychoanalysis from thoughts, beliefs, dream
content, and associations to experiences, feelings and intuitions. In Freud’s discussion with
Rolland, it becomes clear there is a disagreement not merely about the content of religious
experience but about how one can go about discussing it. For Rolland, as Freud states, religion is
“a purely subjective experience, not an article of belief…One may rightly call oneself religious
on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, even though one reject all beliefs and all illusions.”
In response Freud states that these views “put me in a difficult position. I cannot discover this
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oceanic feeling in myself. It is not easy to deal scientifically with feelings” (italics added). While
Freud states that he is comfortable here talking about “the ideational content” of religious beliefs,
and identifying the early childhood wishes or defenses against fears or negative affects that they
contain, he states that he is unable to access or discuss the experience that may underlie religious
belief. Furthermore, he seems to fear that to attempt to base psychoanalytic understanding of
beliefs, behaviors, or mental events on “feelings” may put psychoanalysis on a less objective
foundation.
Although Freud nevertheless does exactly what he claims he cannot do in describing “the
oceanic feeling,” this emphasis on experiences and what Federn will come to term "ego-states” is
one that Freud shows clear ambivalence towards. On one hand, Freud seems aware that the ego
cannot be taken for granted as a constant and independent entity in the mind, inherently
delimited from the id, the object world, and reality. There is clear evidence in the material of
patients in various altered states that the ego is not an inevitable agency whose existence can
always be felt: “the ego’s cognizance of itself can be disturbed.” On the other hand, he seems to
realize that to orient psychoanalytic theory around first-person experiences, states, or feelings,
rather than a third-person systematizing of spoken and observed material would make it a
substantially less objective and empirical discipline.
While some the questions about the ego that are raised in these passages would come to
define the major controversies and conflicts in psychoanalysis over the coming century, other
lines of inquiry were inexplicably abandoned. Beginning with The Ego and the Id (1924) and
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), and continuing into the work of the next generation of
ego psychologists, the unconscious activities of the ego and its functions of defense came to be a
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focal point. And yet, in the above cited passages, when Freud says that our certainty of the ego as
a sharply defined, unitary, continuous entity is, in fact, “a deceptive appearance,” and the ego
merely “forms a façade” over the id, it would seem that he had not given up his older idea of the
ego as thoroughly as the later ego psychologists would make it seem.
Federn’s decision to publish this most defining and influential paper came at a turning
point, in which Freud’s theorizing was moving decisively into a different direction. Just as
Federn was crystalizing some of the work of Freud’s middle period, Freud was himself
crystalizing the discoveries of this phase into what would become the structural model. Whereas
infantile sexuality had predominated his earlier theory of development, in his middle period,
Freud began to examine ideas about the instincts, narcissism, sadism and masochism, the
pleasure principle and the reality principle, as well as the experiences that lie outside or predate
the pleasure principle, and the role of the object. As will be shown in the following chapter,
Federn’s understanding of the ego owes far more to Freud’s metapsychology papers than it does
to The Ego and the Id (1924), or Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926). Whether because of
the influence of Ferenczi in this period, because the analysts who had been steeped in this period
were not able to practice in the United States due to medical licensure laws for licenses from
before 1914 (E. Federn, 2018 p. 125) or simply because of the charisma and influence of
Hartmann and his colleagues, whose theory seemed tailor made for the post-war American ethos
and was more heavily weighted toward Freud’s later period, this phase was comparatively
downplayed in the development of American psychoanalysis. The extent to which American
psychoanalysis would take Freud’s structural model to not simply be a condensation of, or
addition to, his older ideas but as a new starting point for psychoanalytic theory that replaced the
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prior work and models would come to define the American approach to Freud in a way that was
distinct from Britain, France and other countries.
Federn’s work therefore presents to the American psychoanalyst a very different
psychology of the ego. Though “ego psychology” would only begin to emerge over a decade
after Federn’s paper “Some Variations in Ego-Feeling” (1926) in the work of Anna Freud, Heinz
Hartmann in an ego psychology that grew out of Freud’s structural model, Federn seemed to
intuit during the middle period that all of these serious changes, including the additions of new
metapsychological summations, studies of psychosis, narcissism, incorporation, identification,
and the increasingly complex role of the object led to a new estimation and profound questions
about the nature of the ego. As Martin Bergmann (1963 p. 108) wrote,
Between 1914 and 1923 another road leading to the exploration of the ego through the
concept of narcissism and the psychoses was open…it is important to understand that such an
alternative did exist, and of all the psychoanalysts, Federn alone was to persist in the exploration
of the ego from that point of view.
Based on Ellman’s (2010, p. 83) reading of the developmental nodal points in Freud’s
career, Federn’s decision to publish this most defining and influential paper came at a turning
point, in which Freud’s theorizing was moving decisively into a different direction. It is clear
that Federn’s late work, when he had fully developed his theory of the ego and ego-feeling,
emerges out of Freud’s middle period, what Ellman has termed Freud’s “object relations era.”
Lasting from 1916 to 1923--others have dated this period to a few years earlier, likely to
incorporate “On Narcissism” (1914)-- this period is one that Ellman claims is both Freud’s “most
prolific era,” and also the one “least understood by American psychoanalysts.” This is also the
period in which Freud was the most consumed by clinical work with his patients. Ellman also
claims that this era was the one “most influenced by Ferenczi,” and states that this period is the
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one in which object relations and “the pathway to object love” comes to the fore. Whereas
infantile sexuality had predominated his earlier theory of development, Freud’s middle period
begins to incorporate in a fuller way the changing developmental relationship of the infant to its
object, as it navigates between its primal hunger and its autoerotic and primary narcissistic binds
to its objects, moving slowly towards a mature relation. During this period, Freud published his
Metapsychology Papers, as well as most of what would become known as his Technique Papers.
As will be shown in the following chapter, Federn’s understanding of the ego owes far more to
Freud’s metapsychology papers than it does to the works of Freud’s later writing. Whether
because of the influence of Ferenczi in this period, because the analysts who had been steeped in
this period were not able to practice in the United States due to medical licensure laws for
licenses from before 1914 (E. Federn, 2018, p.175) or simply because of the charisma and
influence of Hartmann and his colleagues, whose theory seemed tailor made for the post-war
American ethos and was more heavily weighted toward Freud’s later period, this phase was
comparatively downplayed in the development of American psychoanalysis.
But although Federn’s thinking had departed in some ways from the Freudian
mainstream by 1926, he was still a noted and respected figure during this time, particularly
regarding his work with psychotic patients. By the 1930’s, Freud’s health began to fail and the
Freudian world had already begun to splinter. Successive generations of his disciples, many of
whom had been exposed to different periods of Freud’s development, had further diverged in the
midst of growing differences in emphasis between the practitioners of Vienna, Berlin and
Budapest. This led to a period in which many perspectives were beginning to be held. These
differences were by no means stable. Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, though not yet in the same
city, were beginning their rivalry over the psychoanalysis of children. Federn, along with Jones,
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would eventually hold a series of talks in London in the 1930s in an attempt to foster more
harmony between the two (Steiner, 1988, p. 167). But it would perhaps still be accurate to say
that the trends that led to his ideas fading from influence had begun well before the exodus of the
European analysts and their translation into the American context, even if this came to be the
breaking point.

Federn and Ego Psychology

In an indirect but pervasive sense, the fate of Federn’s ideas in America was inextricably
tied to those of Heinz Hartmann. This is in no small part because of the period in postwar
psychoanalysis that Bergmann (2000) termed “the Hartmann era” in a book of the same title, was
one in which psychoanalysis in America was nearly synonymous with ego psychology, and “ego
psychology” was nearly synonymous with the ideas of Hartmann and his colleagues.1
Hartmann and Federn had very different ideas of what exactly we mean when we use the
word “ego.” This difference had tremendous implications for how psychoanalysts could think
and speak about psychoanalysis. For Federn, when we say “ego” we are talking about “egofeeling,” one’s subjective sense of being, a kind of psychological proprioception. “‘Ego-feeling'”
Federn wrote, “can be described as the feeling of bodily and mental relations in respect to time

1

While one hesitates to contribute to a long and continuing discourse that has at times turned ego psychology
and postwar American psychoanalysis into a sort of caricature or straw man, and while some such as Brenner
(2000) have stated that the label of the “Hartmann era” was a mischaracterization of a time of great
heterogeneity and a variety of different approaches and personalities, Hartmann’s separation of ego (a set of
functions) from self or self-representation does seem to be fairly ubiquitous in American psychoanalysis, even
to this day and across the spectrum of schools and approaches
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and content, the relation being regarded as an uninterrupted or a restored unity” (1926, p.25). But
in the post-war years, American psychoanalysis, following the lead of Hartmann, defined the ego
as a set of mechanisms. This was a distinct idea and concept from “self,” which was used to
express the totality of the psyche, person or personality, whereas “ego” only denoted one part, an
agency of the mind defined by its functioning. In several of his most well-known statements
about what we mean by the word ego, Hartmann does not use Federn’s name, but he nevertheless
explicitly disagrees with Federn’s thinking. For instance, in “Comments on the Psychoanalytic
Theory of the Ego (1950),” Hartmann argues against Federn’s definition:
The word ego is often used in a highly ambiguous way, even among analysts. To define it
negatively, in three respects, as against other ego concepts: "Ego," in analysis, is not
synonymous with "personality" or with "individual"; it does not coincide with the "subject" as
opposed to the "object" of experience; and it is by no means only the "awareness" of the
"feeling" of one's own self [italics added]. In analysis, the ego is a concept of quite a different
order. It is a substructure of personality and is defined by its functions (p.75).
With his inclusion of “it is by no means” Hartmann seems to connote with a particular strength
that he finds Federn’s definition to be wrong. The grounds for separating “ego” from “self” are
clear, and Hartmann was far from the only one to make this argument. The separation of ego and
self was adopted widely, and generally hailed as a step forward in psychoanalytic thinking, and
not merely within the mainstream of American ego psychology, if Loewald’s (1973 p.174)
reference is of any indication.2

2

Though Loewald did speak of Hartmann’s more narrowly specified ego as an advance in his paper “Ego
Organization and Defense” (1973), it would not be accurate to say that Loewald’s work fully endorses
Hartmann’s way of thinking abou the ego. His characterization of the ego as the “psychic present” in “The
Superego and Time” (1962), for instance is an example of a way of thinking about the ego that is much
closer to Federn.
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But for Federn, one could not separate the “I-experience” from the ego functions. Perhaps
one could conceptually distinguish between the two, but his decades of work with psychotic
patients, as well as his front-row seat to thirty-five years of Freud’s developing thought, did not
permit him to believe in the kind of neat distinction made by Hartmann. Federn did not seem to
disagree that the ego performs certain functions, including defense activities and synthesis, but
he asserts that these functions are felt to exist within the sphere of the ego because they are felt to
be a part of the subject’s ego-feeling (1926, p.27). Federn’s observations led him to the
conclusion that before there is a loss of ego functions in a patient moving towards a psychotic
break—even before there is a withdrawal from the object world-- there is always first a collapse
in bodily and mental ego feeling (1932, p. 93). It is therefore possible for the ego functions to
exist for a time without the ego existing as a unified entity. Federn’s argument for this is the
paranoid patient who musters all of his secondary process powers of logic and argumentation to
construct an airtight argument around a delusional worldview; the ego functions are working, but
something in the patient’s narcissistic cathexis and ability to distinguish between reality and
fantasy—his ego-feeling and ego-boundaries-- has been profoundly damaged (1950, p. 207).
The difference is almost one of taste as much as theory. One seems to be confronted with
something less resembling incompatible theories than the very different sensibilities of two
equally gifted psychoanalysts, one rigorously systematic and logic-oriented, the other closer to
an intuitive feeling for primary process and the anxieties and experiences of psychotic patients.
Hartmann’s reading of Freud (1956) in which he builds the case for his re-definition of the ego,
shows an intimidating and brilliant psychoanalytic theorist at work, one with an exacting mind
and an encyclopedic knowledge of Freud. One can easily see how Hartmann’s theoretical gifts
coincided with what has been remarked upon as the almost utopian faith of postwar ego
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psychology in the triumph of logic, reason and systematic thinking. And yet one also cannot
escape the feeling that Federn’s formulations are closer to lived experience and clinical
phenomena, that his ego is one we live in, experience and speak about to our patients, whereas
Hartmann’s can at times feel mechanical, a figment of systematic logic and obsessional exegesis.
But there was no discussion about whether or not to accept Federn’s or Hartmann’s basic
definition of the ego. By the time Hartmann explicitly disagreed again with Federn (1956, p.425)
--again without mentioning his name-- in a paper delivered to the British Psychoanalytic Society,
one wonders why he even bothered. Federn had died from suicide in 1950, and had little lasting
influence in post-war psychoanalysis. Very few analysts in the mainstream of American ego
psychology even bothered to publicly disagree with Federn. His ideas were simply never
engaged with in the first place. If he was thought of, it was often as an obscure footnote, an
outdated figure with ideas that were “esoteric” (Roazen, 2005, p. 34).
The only sustained critical engagement with Federn in postwar American psychoanalysis
came in a review by Edith Jacobson of Federn’s posthumous collection Ego Psychology and the
Psychoses (1952). Her estimation of Federn was mixed. She describes him as ahead of his time,
but also states that reading Federn requires a certain “patience” with his “peculiarities.” On a
theoretical level, she largely takes issue with what she calls his “terminological ambiguity” (p.
519-520), particularly around “ego-feeling,” which she finds “hard to define.”
This preference for psychoanalytic terms to be precise, definable, and unambiguous was
not only a priority for Jacobson but was a hallmark of the theoretical mode promoted by
American postwar psychoanalysis. In the abovementioned 1956 lecture to the British
Psychoanalytic Society, Hartmann made quite clear that the next phase in psychoanalysis was
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going to be a laying out of Freud’s “systematic hierarchy of hypotheses,” in a clear,
unambiguous and scientific way, gently critiquing Freud’s own lack of precision in his
terminology and his unwillingness to say which of his older ideas were obsolete or superseded.
Roy Schafer (1970), in his memorial paper for Hartmann, put the matter in far less gentle terms:
“It is evident that from the first Hartmann was keenly aware of the lack of elegance in
psychoanalytic theory as it stood at the end of Freud's life and work, and that he set about
systematically to develop the elegance that psychoanalysis, by virtue of its tremendous insights,
so richly deserves. He found the theory crude in every one of its metapsychological aspects” (p.
425).
Thus, even Freud did not escape the charge of being insufficiently rigorous and methodical—
inelegant-- in his theorizing. The assumption was that, for instance, in using a word like “Ich,” in
multiple ways, Freud had been careless, and needed the help of his sharper and more systematic
disciples. 3
It can therefore be said that something of Federn’s marginalization seemed to be attached
to a rather abrupt generational shift in the way that psychoanalysts were supposed to think and
present their ideas. Freud (posthumously), Federn, and later Winnicott in his 1968 visit to the
New York Psychoanalytic Institute (Baudry, 2009), would find themselves on the wrong side of
this strong pull in post-war American psychoanalysis, and would often find their ideas criticized
on the grounds of being badly formulated or unclear.
Perhaps the question still haunts psychoanalytic theory as to whether our language should
be precise, scrupulously defined, and contributing to a fully rational and scientific discourse, or
whether it should capture or evoke an experience. We may all agree that some balance would be
ideal—or perhaps that there is a place for both-- but it is important to an understanding of

3

The reader should not assume that the rigorous, scientific quality of analytic thinking and writing from this era
always translated into a stiff, secondary process based approach to clinical practice. Jacobson, for instance, was
said to have practiced in a substantially more direct, creative and unorthodox manner at times (Jacobs, 2000), as
did Hartmann (A. Kris in a verbal presentation, 2020).
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American psychoanalysis that in the post-war years and for a long time after, the balance lay
heavily in the direction of the latter. With exceptional individual practitioners aside, everything
from the theoretical language used, to a highly specified approach to technique, to how Freud
was re-defined, to the exclusion of lay analysts in favor of a psychoanalysis nearly synonymous
with psychiatry, was skewed very strongly in the direction of the scientific-minded and
methodical.
This emphasis on rational, clearly defined terms at the expense of evocative and
experiential language is perhaps most consequential in the re-defining of the ego. The theoretical
import of re-defining an elemental Freudian term cannot be understated. It could well be the
single most defining moment in American psychoanalysis. This distinction between ego and self
can be found across American schools and is a nearly ubiquitous assumption, while no other
nation’s psychoanalytic tradition seems to embrace this split. But the question can certainly be
raised how much a theory advanced in a language so thoroughly and completely dominated by
the secondary process might lose touch with the primary process that is ostensibly its subject.
The attempt to precisely define Ich in psychoanalysis ultimately led to a splintering of
terms. But what if in talking about the ego, the subject, subjectivity, the self, self-representation,
identity, personality and character, however precisely defined and autonomous each of these
terms may be, we have dissected into lifeless pieces a more experiential whole that Freud’s Ich
was originally meant to imply—everything that we implicitly and experientially know to be
meant by the word “I?” As Bettelheim argued (1984, p.10), with the translation of Freud’s
language into English and into the American medical system, we may have literally lost “the
soul” of his thinking. The Freud who won the Goethe Prize in Literature for his writing, who
understood that the language we use to describe psychoanalysis can have value not only in its
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rigorous exactitude but also in its ability to resonate with and evoke experience, often by making
use of the very ambiguity and double meaning that Hartmann and others criticized him for, may
have been censored out of the manifest content of American psychoanalysis.
What Jacobson called Federn’s “terminological ambiguity” may thus be precisely what
makes his work useful now. Contrary to Jacobson’s criticism that Federn’s term “ego-feeling”
was ill-defined, or Hartmann’s frustration with what Schafer called the “lack of elegance” in
Freud’s theorizing, the argument can be made that perhaps both Freud and Federn implicitly
understood the importance of using a term that is simple and elemental enough that it needs no
definition and cannot be explained. This is perhaps what Federn’s theory of ego-feeling now has
to offer us: a chance to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

Ego-Feeling
Federn’s idea is experiential on the most basic level. In a more literal translation,
Federn’s term ego-feeling would be “I-feeling.” It is difficult find two words more fundamental
to experience than “I” and “feeling.” When we use the word “feel,” at least in English, there is
what Lakoff and Johnson (2008, p. 8) would call a “conceptual metaphor,” which is to say the
description of an abstract concept with a metaphor based in bodily experience. We talk about
feeling in terms of a literal sense of touch, but also as a form of mentation that is less precise and
rational; there can often be an emotional or affective component to when we talk about feeling or
“feelings,” but we can also say that we feel something in the sense that we intuit it, or know it in
a way we cannot fully explain. On a purely physiological and functional level, feeling is a
significantly less precise mode of perception than seeing. But we find a kind of ubiquitous
assumption that it is the very lack of precision involved in feeling that gives us access to a
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different kind of knowledge. From the work of Keats whose poems are filled with an equation of
blindness with a more poetic kind of insight—and whose his term regarding this notion,
“negative capability (1817, p. 277)” was imported into psychoanalysis by Bion (1970, p.125)-- to
the image of a blind justice, whose neutrality and objectivity comes from being blindfolded,
“feeling” speaks to an older and perhaps more holistic way of perceiving. When we say we feel a
thing to be true, we are in a sense saying that we know something without fully knowing how we
know it, or we know something in a way that is not fully a matter of reason and evidence but
through a kind of experience. But, unlike knowledge or insight, feeling is also fickle. A feeling
can come over us, and it can disappear. We may “feel” angry and say something, only to be left
with the consequences of what we have said after the anger has passed. We may remember a
feeling-state, but that is not the same as being in it. Whether or not we are in a personalized state
(as opposed to depersonalized), Federn’s work suggests, is entirely a matter of this kind of fickle,
intuitive “feeling.”
When Federn states that the nucleus of the ego is ego-feeling (1926, p.25), he is stating
that the experience of existing as a feeling, thinking “I”, capable of relating to others, of existing
in one’s body and existing in reality—what is at stake in psychotic illness—is a matter of this
kind of feeling. This kind of feeling is the basis for the ego, and its functions exist within the area
of this feeling if they are really felt to be ours. But it is also highly unstable, and even in healthy
individuals. It is costly to maintain in terms of psychic energy, and it fluctuates over the course
of our daily existence. For young children or borderline patients, having this kind of feeling for
oneself may be somewhat or entirely contingent upon the presence of another. For schizoid
patients, or patients with traumatic early relationships that have led them to see closeness or
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intimacy as a kind of intolerable merger or a feeling of being swallowed, this ego-feeling may
only be safely sustainable at a distance from others.
It is not hard to see why, like Freud’s own ideas, Federn’s ideas may have been resisted
due to the anxiety and narcissistic injury they might give rise to. Our whole mentalized
existence, Federn suggests, is balanced precariously on our moment-to-moment ability to sustain
a subjective feeling of having an “I”. Like how the moment when having one’s attention drawn
the balance of a bicycle causes the bicycle to sway, the revelation of this fragile continuity and
equilibrium which is the only thing that stands between us and psychosis is as much a threat to
our narcissism as the discovery of the unconscious.

Federn and Contemporary Psychoanalysis
Political, theoretical, psychological and institutional explanations aside, there may have
been one last and crucial reason why Federn’s theory was largely dismissed: he was too far
ahead of his time. As we have shown, Jacobson found his work “peculiar” and to have been
based on unclear terminology, and Hartmann disagreed entirely with his definition of the ego.
But another common reaction to Federn’s theory at the time was simply one of confusion.
Riccardo Steiner (1988, p.173) documents a letter that Ernest Jones wrote to Anna Freud in
1938, asking for an appraisal of Federn, and stating that he could not understand his writing.
Steiner suspected Jones was trying to figure out which of the émigré analysts he wanted to bring
to London, given limits to how many he could sponsor. Anna Freud responded that “the question
concerning Federn’s work is a very difficult one to be answered properly. We all have the same
question concerning the possibility of understanding him as you describe,” stating as well that
she had tried several times to “understand what he meant,” and that Marie Bonaparte had the
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same experience. More charitably, Anna Freud says that Federn was “ a good observer in clinical
matters,” but that “it was obvious that he did not succeed in expressing what he meant.” This is,
of course, a recurrent theme in the criticisms of Federn.
But this inability to understand Federn is also quite confusing. One can only speak for
oneself, but, as fellow contemporary readers of Federn will perhaps agree, Federn’s writing is
rather clear and not terribly difficult to understand (certainly as far as psychoanalytic theory
goes). Furthermore, Edith Jacobson, Anna Freud, Ernest Jones and Marie Bonaparte were hardly
unsophisticated readers. But perhaps Federn’s work only makes sense to us in light of what has
come after. Many of the ideas Federn seems to be working towards may actually seem to
contemporary psychoanalysts to be quite familiar. If not for subsequent developments that have
made Federn more legible, perhaps Federn would seem as nonsensical to us now as he did in
1938 or 1950. Federn comes to us now as a kind of apres coup-- as something historical that
suddenly can be accommodated into our thinking that we did not have the capacity to make
meaning out of at the time.
At a time when classical metapsychology is widely seen as obsolete, it seems that a
renewed examination of the meaning and usefulness of basic psychoanalytic terms is necessary if
the argument is to be made for the continued relevance of a term such as “ego.” Of all the
theorists from the mid-1920’s through the 1980’s who made their subject the ego, there was one
question that only Federn made his life’s work to address: what is the ego? Federn’s answer is
that the ego is an experience, an ego-feeling. There is something of a tautology in this—having
an ego is an experience, and the ego is that which experiences. Ego-feeling is therefore the
experience of experiencing, or the experiencing of experience. While this may seem abstract and
philosophical, it is the hope that these chapters will show the clinical utility of this line of
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thinking, particular when the fluctuations in ego-feeling can become seen as a key to
understanding a wide array of mental phenomena.
Most importantly, at a time when “insight” is widely seen as too narrow a goal for
psychoanalytic work, Federn’s idea of ego-feeling postulates that a healthy ego, and indeed a
healthy psyche, may include the capacity for insight, but this is in fact built on something much
more foundational. What Federn’s work points to is that insight is not sufficient if there is not a
more basic intuition, older than insight or language, that there is an “I” in which external
perceptions, internal sensations, and impulses come together and form an experience, and that
experience is a part of a continuous story that occurs amid a coherent reality that includes
internal psychic reality within the ego’s boundaries, and time, space, and cause and effect outside
of them. This is not something that can be figured out intellectually or explained; anyone who
has to reason this to be true for themselves is missing a very basic kind of feeling that no amount
of intellectual insight can make up for.
In a sense, this means that Federn’s theory is less a psychoanalysis of meaning or of
functioning than a psychoanalysis of experience and connectivity. Philosophically, this approach
would be seen as being in common with phenomenology. This was known and talked about as
such; Hartmann (1939, p.7) wrote that Federn’s studies of the fluctuations in ego feeling were
only useful and psychoanalytic to the degree that they went beyond “phenomenology.” It is
noteworthy that in “Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego” (1927, p. 59), and in he cites
Minkowski, a follower of Bergson, as well as noting Schilder’s use of a quote by Husserl (p.
40), suggesting that this connection was not merely one of sensibility, but that he may have had
some exposure to phenomenology through some familiarity with philosophy. Though using the
word “ego,” Federn’s metapsychology is uniquely constructed as an attempt to systematize first-
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person, subjective experience—including the gaps in experience-- rather than speaking of an
abstracted “structure” or “agency.”
Although Federn’s theory most explicitly deals with issues more common to psychotic
and borderline patients, it also contains the possibility for a very different understanding of the
treatment of neurosis as well. For Federn, ego-feeling is particularly charged along the borders of
the ego, or the ego-boundaries. We can extrapolate, then, that the work of psychoanalysis for a
neurotic patient, therefore, is less about explaining the unconscious, or gaining mastery over it,
and more about an increase in feeling at the border of the ego and id. The neurotic patient has a
relatively stable and continuous “I”, but how much that I has access to dream-life and the
primary process, how tolerant it is of its impulses and affects, how much it can “feel” what is
below the surface without having to numb or distort that feeling through various defensive
operations, is the question that determines the patient’s level of neurosis. Rather than conquering
the unconscious and forcing it to accept logic and sense, in Federn’s understanding,
psychoanalysis creates a deeper proprioception of one’s unconscious life, a greater connectivity,
feeling and possibility for communication between ego-feeling and the unconscious. Federn’s
notion of ego-boundaries, which apply equally to both the internal boundaries between ego and
id and to the external boundaries between ego and reality or ego and object, can be seen as a
bridge between the intrapsychic and the intersubjective, the latter being a dimension which has
come to be seen as of increasing importance in psychoanalysis, and for which discussions of
internal structure are frequently abandoned when it is under discussion.
Thus, although Federn became the epitome for Rado’s group of the orthodox Freudian
who hindered the development of psychoanalysis into a truly scientific discipline (Makari, 2008,
476), although Hartmann, Jacobson and Anna Freud found his work to be either misguided or
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unreadable, it is the hope that these chapters may actually show Federn’s work to constitute a
classical Freudian approach that may be uniquely suited to contemporary psychoanalysis.
Federn’s metapsychology is experiential, his notion of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries lends
itself to contemporary ideas about intersubjectivity, his depictions of the fluctuations in egofeeling and ego-states have many similarities to relational ideas about “self-states “ (Bromberg
1996), his ideas about bodily ego feeling lend themselves easily to current ideas about the role of
the imagined or mentalized body in thinking and pathology. And Federn was able to reconcile
these ideas with the core of Freudian thinking, never abandoning the role of instincts, dreams and
fantasies and the unconscious.
And so perhaps the most powerful “intervention” Federn can offer us now is to make
metapsychology seem meaningful again. Rather than being opposed to experience, Federn’s is a
metapsychology of experience. Not only is Federn’s ego not mechanistic, it is also not static. In
many ways it can be thought of as very literally taking up Freud’s comparison of the ego to an
amoeba (1914, p.75), extending itself outward into the world, and then shrinking back, always
feeling what is on its borders. In primary narcissism, infantile experience, moments of romantic
closeness, or in religious experiences, it extends out past the body to encompass an object or the
wider world; in sleep and psychosis it shrinks inwards, separating itself even from bodily egofeeling. If therapeutic work is often thought of through a sensory metaphor, Federn shows that
before mental sight (insight, clarity, exposing unconscious material “to the light of day”), there
has to be feeling-- the contact, negotiation, and proprioception that occurs at the borders of self
and other, and at the borders of ego and id, ego and reality, ego and superego, something closer
to a basic intuition.
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With this at the core of his thinking, Federn was able to approach with refreshing clarity a
number of topics that can now benefit from our examination. The centrality of the body ego
(1926), depersonalization and derealization (1927), the role of ego feeling in dreams(1927), the
experience of mental pain (1950), and technique for working with psychotic patients (1950) are
just a few of the topics Federn illuminated through his work. All of these were revolutionary for
Federn’s time and many can still carry the potential in our own time to stimulate our thought and
question what a “Freudian” understanding and practice might look like.

Chapter 2: From Freud’s Ego to Federn’s Ego-Feeling
When Freud discovered ego libido and introduced the concept of narcissism, a new field was
opened for psychoanalytic investigation...It also demanded of psychoanalysts that they revise
what they had learned unless they were to rest content with word-knowledge and faith in
authority. Previously it had been easy to consider the basic distinction between the ego drives
and the sexual drives as the basis of the dynamic conception of, for instance, the neuroses. Now
the ego itself became a libidinally cathected agency…
--Paul Federn “On the Distinction Between Healthy and Pathological Narcissism” (1935, p.323)

All night the sound had
come back again,
and again falls
this quiet, persistent rain.
What am I to myself
that must be remembered,
insisted upon
so often?
From “The Rain” by Robert Creeley (1962, p. 75)
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Writing a contemporary work based on Federn’s ideas comes with certain unique
challenges. Unlike writing a paper on a more established writer, one can assume little familiarity
with Federn, even among seasoned psychoanalysts and scholars of psychoanalytic theory.
Furthermore, as a writer “ahead of his time,” it is difficult to fully separate his ideas, many of
which contain the germ or prototype for later work, from more the more well-known and more
contemporary ideas that he seemed unusually prescient in foreshadowing.
What follows is a basic summation, and what is perhaps an inevitably subjective reading
of Federn’s theory from 1926 until the end of his life. This is not the first summation (Weiss
1951; Jacobson 1953; Bergmann 1963; Pao 1975). Moreover, Federn’s papers from this period
are readily available in English translation. The following chapter is therefore not intended as a
replacement for previous summations or for simply reading Federn’s papers. It is a record of a
contemporary engagement with Federn’s theory. This in part seems necessary because, despite
Weiss’s admirable work in editing Ego Psychology and the Psychoses (1952), a reader gets the
notion that Federn has a fairly systematic view of things that is never exactly spelled out in an
extended schematic fashion. Simultaneously, because the chapters are generally derived from
distinct lectures, and Federn could not assume a basic understanding of his ideas, one finds him
repeating the same assertions in multiple chapters, only to find that he suddenly casts a small
aside in a talk, often having ostensibly little to do with the topic of the paper, that seems to be of
monumental import. Either because the years of Federn’s life that occurred after his initial paper
on ego-feeling (1926) were so tumultuous, or because loyalty to Freud kept him from fully
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developing his own ideas until he felt they were reasonably calibrated with Freud’s development,
it stands to reason that he simply may never had had the ability to spell out his theory in a
systematic way, perhaps in an extended monograph of his own. Several authors (cited above)
have therefore also seen the necessity of spelling out his theory in a summative way. But writing
the first such summation in forty-five years, one realizes that although Federn died in 1950, the
Federn that was encountered in 1953 or 1975 seems different than the Federn one encounters in
2022. It is perhaps unavoidable to read a historical figure in psychoanalysis through the lens of
one’s own time or theoretical approach, but reading Federn now, it seems that in many ways
psychoanalysis is perhaps finally catching up.
Federn’s metapsychology is deliberately not a complete one. He did not seek to create a
new theory as much as he simply tried to make use of Freudian metapsychology to accommodate
the phenomena he was observing, often while working with a very different population of
patients. This largely meant focusing on a narrow area that psychoanalysis at that time (and
perhaps ours as well) had insufficiently focused on. For a practitioner, this means that ways of
thinking about non-neurotic illness can be brought into the standard vocabulary of ego, id and
superego, but with the flexibility to describe not only the nature of neurotic conflict but the
nature of more primitive gaps in relating, structured experience, and a subjective sense of being.1
While Freud, as Anzieu wrote (1985, p. 95), was interested in the “kernel of things,”
Federn was interested in the boundaries (the “periphery” in Segal’s translation of Anzieu). As a
parallel statement, Anzieu stated that whereas Freud studied dreams, Federn studied hypnagogic

1

Certainly later theorists such as Porder, Abend and Willick (1988) have attempted to use the structural model
towards nonneurotic patients as well, but as this chapter will show, Federn’s version of this is based around a
different view of the ego. When the above authors argue against too much of an assumption of “ego-deficits” in a
borderline patient, with the argument that nobody has sufficiently defined these “deficits”, perhaps the work of
Federn can provide such a definition.
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phenomena, those peripheral experience on the border of sleep and waking. To this we can add
that, where for Freud the cornerstone of his metapsychology was repression--or later, anxiety,
with Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926)-- the cornerstone of Federn’s theory was
depersonalization and derealization. If Freud’s great blow to our “naïve narcissism” was that
man is “not even master of his own house,” (1917, p.241) then Federn’s addendum was to point
out how often man is not at home. For Federn, this means both being psychically present in
reality and feeling psychically housed in one’s body, and that these are in fact largely
intertwined. In his understanding, these both fluctuate greatly in the course of everyday life, but
to lose these (or fear losing these) in a sudden or uncontrollable way goes very much to the heart
of what we mean when we speak about mental illness.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to fully appreciate Federn’s contribution outside of the context
of Freud’s. As Chapter 1 established, it is likely that Federn had never intended to be a “theorist”
in his own right. Certainly, every historical description of him has noted his unfailing loyalty to
Freud. Nevertheless, Federn’s pioneering work with psychotic patients seems to have forced him
to expand, or give his own definition of, certain Freudian concepts in order to accommodate the
clinical material.

Freud’s Middle Phase: The Ego Enters the Scene
As Federn stated in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, Freud’s work beginning in
1914 threw into disarray what had been a relatively straightforward theory. Beginning with “On
Narcissism” (1914), the ego forced itself onto the stage as an important and complex entity. By
this time, Freud had already substantially undermined the notion that we know what we are
thinking and that we say what we really mean. We are creatures of desire, and our unconscious
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lives are made up of forbidden wishes, which are disguised. A patient may say he hates someone,
but really loves he them. He may feel oppressed by his boss at work, but really be struggling
with a rivalry and castration anxiety toward his father over the affection of his mother. But until
around the time of “On Narcissism” (1914) and “Mourning and Melancholia” (1916), the patient
himself was a fixed variable. The Freudian patient of the first period of Freud’s development
may not really allow himself to know what he desires or whom he desires, but he at least knows
who he is. The listening analyst of this time may have to engage in substantial work to uncover
the depths underlying what is being said, but he at least knew (or thought he knew) who was
speaking. The topographical model and the economic considerations up to this point
encompassed a metapsychology of thoughts and their relation to libidinal investment,
representation and language, and access to consciousness. But in the nineteen-teens, it was not
only thoughts but the identity and self-experience of the thinker that came to force itself into
Freud’s project.
As Martin Blum has written (2018), in Freud’s earlier period, from The Interpretation of
Dreams to Dora, he was able to show how the same neurotic structure around a repressed sexual
wish toward an object revealed itself in disguised form in dreams, neurotic symptoms,
transference phenomena, and the analytic situation. But as Freud began to treat more narcissistic
patients, he began to suspect that their love objects involved transference of self-love. As Blum
writes,
This… is Freud's first definition of narcissism. It is a mode of object relations, a way of
relating to other people created by the replacement of a transference object with an identification.
As a result the narcissist takes himself, internally, as his own object (i.e., he creates a selfreferential loop within his own psychic apparatus, a self-self relationship). (2018, p. 3)
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Therefore, by the time Freud wrote On Narcissism (1914), he had significant analytic
data to speak to a libidinal investment not only in objects but in the ego, and object choices that
were in fact narcissistic object choices, objects that reflected or sustained the ego’s love of itself.
With the discovery of the direction of the libido toward the self, it became possible for a
Freudian patient to say “I love that person,” but actually be speaking about a transference from a
primary love relationship in which the original love object was himself, or some wished-for,
fantasied or lost version of himself. Equally, it became possible to speak about a murderous selfhatred in which the person has substituted his own self for the ambivalently loved lost object.
Suddenly the patient can love or hate the ego as an object, or an object as an extension of the
ego, and on some level may not be entirely clear of the difference. Working with narcissistic
object love, with depression, and with psychosis, Freud began to trace the profoundly complex
dynamics inherent in the subject’s relationship to himself.
To this, Freud’s psychoanalytic study of group phenomena led to the insight that the ego
can lose its individual self in the context of the group, allowing the repressed instincts to fully
give way to expression through group behaviors, guided by a leader to represents the ego ideal
(Freud, 1921). The ego and its varying and shifting libidinal investments in itself, became yet
another variable in the increasingly complex psychoanalytic equation.
But meanwhile, Freud was coming at the problem of the ego from another, entirely
different angle. At the time of his writing of “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” (1915), Freud
understood there to be two primary instincts that he could not further reduce by psychoanalytic
investigation—the libidinal instinct and the self-preservative instinct, which Freud termed an
“ego-instinct.” For a brief period during this time, Freud understood neurosis as the struggle
between these two competing instincts—the instinct toward libidinal pleasure finds itself at odds
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with the ego-instincts for self-preservation and mastery. In this model, our instinct toward
satisfaction and our instinct toward survival are often in conflict with each other.
One can see Freud struggling with a major difficulty at this point: the extent to which ego
is “biological.” Freud abandoned this model after a brief amount of time. But in some ways,
Freud’s thinking, and particularly that strain that was picked up by ego psychology, never fully
gave up on the ego instinct model. Among the other instincts that Freud saw as underpinning the
ego were the drive towards mastery and the ego’s orientation to reality; thus, the ego of
Hartmann can seem to have some beginning’s in this earlier phase as well.
It should be clear that by this point the word “ego” in Freud’s use of it, had acquired two
very different meanings, and would continue to develop along these two separate tracks. One is
the id’s representative to reality whose existence is best explained in terms of adaptation, both to
external and internal pressures. In this sense, ego was necessary, instinctually based and to some
degree innate. Born of the tension between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, this
ego delays gratification, manages the subject’s approach to reality, and manages the forbidden
instincts through various defense mechanisms. This idea of the ego seems entirely justifiable to a
scientifically-minded standpoint. Even a leopard that patiently stalks its prey has motor planning
and the ability to delay gratification; it has some mastery over its environment and over its
hunger which would surely urge it to leap immediately. In both denotation and connotation, the
ego of adaptation is a Darwinian one. All of this can be fully explained without any complex
theory of the leopard’s “sense of self,” or its object relations. To simply multiply that by the
exponentially larger brain of a human being, the human ego is capable of all manner of
adaptation to internal and external pressures and tensions, often finding ingenious solutions that
satisfy both simultaneously to a certain degree. If a person does not in fact go about his business
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with the mastery and efficiency of a leopard, it is because he is far more conflicted about the
expression of his instincts; his ego and id, unlike the leopard’s, are divided against each other,
and he even has a superego to further complicate things. This is the price, Freud will argue in
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), of living in a society.
The second ego, the ego of Freud’s theories of narcissism and object relations, does not
have its own instinct from which it derives its existence. Unlike the simple, elegant and
seemingly scientific ego of the first theory, nothing about this ego is straightforward. In
narcissism, it is both the subject and the object of its own libidinal self-love—it can treat itself as
another and another as a part of itself. Through the mechanism of identification, it can
experience itself as one of its objects, and in melancholia it can be the object of its own
condemnatory hatred as a result of its identifications. It can introject or incorporate an object.
Nothing about this ego can be taken for granted, nor can any kind of straightforward libidinal tie
to its object be assumed. Even if there is something about the ego that is not dynamically
constituted, it seemed beyond a doubt that a subject’s experience of, relations with, and fantasies
of, his or her own ego, are thoroughly idiosyncratic, and subject to fluctuations and instability.
There are, as a result, two egos, a functional ego of adaptation whose existence is nearly
biological, and another ego, based on a person’s subjective sense of himself, which is both
formed out of and continually negotiated against its objects. From 1914 to 1921, it may have
seemed that a theory oriented around this second view of the ego would become predominant. It
is actually most accurate to say that Freud did not abandon either model, likely because there is
sufficient analytic and extra-analytic data to speak to both viewpoints. It is the belief of these
chapters that both Freud and Federn may have understood that, however conceptually separable
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these may be, the two egos were so bound up with each other that separating them leads to a
cleaner and more elegant theory that is further from clinical reality.
How to reconcile these two derivations of the ego continues to be a matter of difference
and controversy among psychoanalysts. Nearly all theories find a way to accommodate both of
these lines of thinking, but the question of which is primary and which is secondary is a major
point of difference. The addition of the variable of the thinker to psychoanalysis, which had
previously taken thoughts as its primary subject, led to a specific question: does the thinker
create the thoughts, or do the thoughts create the thinker2? Hartmann enshrined in America a
version of psychoanalysis in which the former was assumed to be the case. By separating the ego
from the self, the ego, unlike the self, became something relatively constant. The self could be
loved or hated, found or lost or confused with an object, but the ego was more or less a
depersonalized functional entity, like a smartphone, and the only real question was how well it
was functioning or whether its apps (defenses and various other functions) needed to be updated.
Self-experience comes secondary to this primary and assumed existence of the ego: one of the
ego’s functions is to create a self-representation. To many, the focus and insights available from
psychoanalysis moved from the unconscious life of the patient to discernible patterns in the
patient’s defensive structure, which came to be talked about as the patient’s character. From here
we can derive the notion of character as something relatively fixed, and the patient’s thoughts or
mental productions as proceeding from having a certain kind of character or mental structure.
That is not to say that there is not something fundamentally dynamic about the kinds of conflicts
that lead to a certain character structure. But it becomes possible to say, for instance, that a

2

We will continue to use this distinction of “the thinker creates the thoughts” versus “the thoughts create the
thinker,” but we are doing so for lack of a more total word. By “thoughts” we mean images, fantasies, impulses,
dreams, enactments, behaviors. “Psychic productions” might perhaps be a possible word, but the point here is
that, according to the more radical reading of this theory, it is the psyche that is the production.
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certain action or fantasy is “typical of a narcissistic patient.” The thinker is primary in this
conceptualization, and the thought follows from it. Moreover, it became axiomatic that, in order
to do any work to analyze a certain kind of patient, one had to “chip away,” at their defensive
character structure. The assumption in these cases is that the ego inherently exists, and it must be
helped to function more properly. Something about the relatively static and stable nature of the
ego’s defensive mechanisms, and perhaps self-and-object representations, explains the patient’s
behaviors, thoughts or dreams. Changing the ego-- by strengthening or making it aware of its
defenses3, or by helping it to see the distortions it is engaging in-- will then change the conscious
manifestation of the thoughts and behaviors.
But Freud left us with a much more radical possibility—that the thoughts create the
thinker. In the period during which Freud had begun to grapple with the ego but still used the
topographic model, it seemed possible to treat the word “I” as a word-presentation, with some
much deeper, overdetermined and proprioceptive sense of who that person was, as the attached
thing-presentation. In this far more radical and unsettling version of the ego, it is the thoughts,
experiences and sensations and their elaborations in fantasy, that create the thinker. The ego is an
idea we have, a mental production we have come to, a mental investment we have made. Like
any other idea, it can come to us, but a contradictory one can come to us the next moment; like
any other mental production, it is subject to distortion and fantasy; and like any other mental
investment, libido can be withdrawn from it or lost. Our dreams, fantasies, wishes, identifications
and early experiences give birth to, and are in every moment creating, a subject. The ego, like a
river, gives the illusion of being a constant thing, but it is in fact constantly being created
differently in any given moment.

3

One can see from the use of the word “it” for ego how much it becomes depersonalized
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If one does believe that the thoughts create the thinker, it makes little sense to separate
the self from the ego. Once the thoughts have created the thinker, there can then be the
experience of being a thinker, and this becomes a fundamental lynchpin around which the
thoughts and feelings and desires become organized. The ego then becomes a necessary fantasy,
however distorted or maladaptive, that allows the patient to navigate in the world and manage his
or her internal life and external relationships. The ego becomes “the conductor” of the
“orchestra” that Kraeplin (1919) claimed was lacking in schizophrenia, and the ego functions are
the various instruments. The narcissistic investment becomes what Dennett calls the “center of
narrative gravity” around which the ego-functions can be organized. But the existence of the
conductor or the center of gravity is, in Federn’s understanding, propped up on a “feeling.”
This paper argues that it was this radical Freudian assertion, which was largely lost in the
translation of Freudian thinking into American psychoanalysis, that Bergmann was referring to
when he stated that Federn alone constructed an ego-psychology around Freud’s middle period
studies of narcissism and psychosis. In his conception of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries, Federn
recognized just how fragile that ego-experience is, and how difficult it is to sustain and maintain.
More importantly he realized that the experience is fluid, encompassing shifting and changing
ego-boundaries and moments when ego-feeling is diminished or lost. What came to be termed
the “ego-functions” could not be understood as autonomous from these varying qualities and
fluctuations in ego-feeling, which was itself a psychic creation. If Freud, with his structural
model, was creating the anatomy of the subject’s experience of his own psyche, then Federn was
at the same time organizing a theory around how close those internal relationships always are to
breaking down.
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The Post-Freudian Ego
Though this has been mentioned in the introduction, it bears repeating, as it can lead to
real confusion when understanding Federn’s theory: one obstacle for a modern American
psychoanalytic reader is that Federn does not use the word “ego” in the way that we are entirely
accustomed. If Freud’s ego was already ambiguous and possessing of multiple valences, the
translation of Freudian theory and practice into postwar America arguably added further
confusion (despite the intent of its architects to clarify). To begin with, the translation of Freud’s
theory into English led to translating Freud’s ich (literally “I,”) into the abstract Latinate ego. In
comparison, French (le moi), Spanish (el yo) and Italian (il io) all chose to translate this word
into something much more literal and experiential. If one were to take a language class in
French, Spanish or Italian, these words would very likely be among the first a student would
learn on the first day of class. The English term “ego” carries with it a significantly greater level
of abstraction and remove from experience.
To further add to this confusion, American psychoanalysis began to parse the concept
into many distinct elements. Beginning with Hartmann’s (1950) distinction between the ego and
the self, there became a dichotomy. The ego was a part of the mind defined by its functions; this
was not the “I”, but simply a “substructure of the personality…defined by its functions”
(Hartmann 1950, p. 75). Kohut (1971), although siding with the self and not the ego, essentially
bought into this distinction, and so in response to ego psychology, there also became a selfpsychology. Jacobson (1964) tried to reintegrate the notion of “self” into ego psychology by
focusing on the idea of the self-representation, a mental representation of the self that is
secondary to the fact of there being an ego (Kelen 1990, p. 25). This is not the case in other
psychoanalytic traditions; for the most part, both Klein and Winnicott used “ego” and “self”
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interchangeably (Abram 1996, p.157). Laplanche and Pontalis explicitly disagreed with
Hartmann’s decision to make this distinction on the grounds that the ambiguity and difference
between these two meanings of ego is precisely what is at stake in neurosis (1967, p.127).
Frequently, this redefining of “ego” in American psychoanalysis seems to be forgotten,
even when we read Freud’s writing from before this distinction was made. How frequently, when
we read “where id was there ego shall be” (1933, p. 80) do we remember that Freud’s word
“ego” simply meant “I,” and that it included both the ego-functions and subjectivity? Freud did
not mean that where id was a set of ego-functions would be; he meant that where id was there I
shall be—the id/unconscious becomes personalized, not just made subject to secondary process
and healthier defenses. Many of Freud’s other most famous utterances, such as “the shadow of
the object falls upon the ego”(1917, p. 249), or “the ego is first and foremost a body ego” (1923,
p. 26) are relatively straightforward when “ego” includes subjectivity, and are meaningless when
ego is narrowed to being a set of functions.
Some of Federn’s major essays were written significantly before Hartmann’s distinction,
but Federn’s later work in America continues with his current terminology; furthermore, in an
earlier era of arguments around what was meant by ego, Federn explicitly disagreed with
Nunberg’s definition of the ego as a set of functions (1927b, p. 60). For Federn, one had to
accept the contradiction that ego was both a part of the psyche and the experience of the totality
of the psyche, that it performed certain functions but it was made of one’s sense of being (p. 61).
In our contemporary terms we can say that this leads to a definition of ego that includes what has
been generally called “ego,” “self,” and “self-representation” within the same term. Whatever
Federn may have believed about the degree to which these were conceptually separable entities,
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the whole notion of ego-feeling is that, in health, the subject experiences some feeling
connecting these separable entities and functions into an experience of having an “I.”

Federn’s Freudian Synthesis

This question of what we mean by “I” or “ego” in a psychoanalytic context was very
much at the center of Federn’s work. It is not only the terminology that shifts; every single
individual who carries the burden of having an “I” uses the word “I” at different times and to
connote subtly different phenomena. In fact, Federn’s theory revolves around a word used only
once in Freud’s writing. In “Mourning and Melancholia” (1918, p.244), Freud begins with the
observation of the similarities between a person in mourning and a person suffering from
melancholic depression. Freud notes that there is “one exception” to what are otherwise striking
similarities: “the disturbance of self-regard [that one observes in melancholia] is absent in
mourning.” The German word Ichgefull, which James Strachey translates as “self-regard,” is not
exactly accurate, although there is not an exact English word that is available. Freud does not
mean low self-regard in the way we might think (as in a low self-esteem). Rather, in context we
can see that it refers not to negative attributions about the self (Freud covers this separately, in
his discussion of the harsh recriminations) but a diminishment in the conviction that one is a self
at all. It is this very word Ichgefull, which Strachey translated as “self-regard” that forms the
basis of Federn’s whole theory, and which Edoardo Weiss translated as “ego-feeling” (1952).
Included in the idea of melancholia then, is that there is not only a loss of the object, but the
experience of a narcissistic loss—the diminishment of a sense of aliveness or self-experience.
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Using this term, Federn constructed a theory of the ego and psychosis, based on small
observations which had immense theoretical import. In a sense, the whole of Federn’s
contribution to psychoanalytic theory is based on this concept, and then the profound
implications of that claim that arise in metapsychology, dream psychology, neurosis, psychosis,
clinical technique, and society. For Federn, there can be no useful clinical understanding of the
ego without beginning with the basic fact that the ego is not a structure whose existence can be
taken for granted, but a subjective experience: ego-feeling. “Ego-feeling,” Federn writes, “is the
sensations, constantly present, of one’s own person” (1927b p.60). Ego-feeling fluctuates in
quality and degree throughout the day, but in health, ego-feeling includes a sense that one’s
personality has a continuity in space and time, with a prior history and a sense that, as long as
one is physically alive, one will continue on as oneself. Ego-feeling can be conscious or
preconscious, but it is very difficult to stay purely conscious of ego-feeling for very long (1927b,
p. 61).4
For Federn, ego-feeling is a feeling of unity between what are in fact discrete elements.
This holds up to basic experience. When we try to define what we mean by “I,” we are putting
together several different entities: we derive our internal feeling of being an “I” from some
combination of bodily proprioception, autobiographical memory, a name, as well as the
experience of having a mind and thoughts. But in healthy waking life, all of these things come
together; we say “I” and it feels like the most simple and elemental word. We assume that we
know exactly what we mean and that everyone else will also. Ego-feeling is sometimes specified
to a single domain Federn’s writing, such as in discussions of “mental ego-feeling” or “bodily

4

Perhaps meditation or “mindfulness” can be thought of as an exercise in being conscious of one’s ego-feeling
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ego-feeling”, but in general, ego-feeling is a holistic synthesis of disparate sensations and
functions into a single experience of being an “I.”
One can see how Federn’s method of investigation towards discovering the nature of the
ego paralleled Freud’s investigation of dreams, slips and parapraxes (both in himself and in
clinical material) toward the establishment of his mature theory of the unconscious. Federn’s
papers are filled with personal and clinical evidence of his theories, including detailed
descriptions of symptoms in patients, as well as taking note of his own experiences, most notably
“A Dream Under General Anesthesia (1943).”
Through these methods, Federn arrived at a definition of the ego based around the
fluctuations of ego-feeling in pathology and in normal life, how it expands and contracts and
how, in many patients, ego-feeling can be existentially at stake. With his idea of ego-feeling,
Federn took a pathological process that Freud had described—the libidinal narcissistic cathexis
of a person who loves himself as a desired object (what Blum called the self-self relationship)
and saw a variation of this as a necessary process in the experience of the ego as an ongoing, real
entity. When he delivered his lecture “Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego” (1928, p.38),
Federn made the argument that the maintenance of the ego requires a steady infusion of libido.
Because Federn worked with patients with what would come to be called severe ego
deficits, he came to see that these patients suffered from experiences in which they ceased to be
real to themselves, ceased to experience reality as real, or experienced a profound loss, shift or
instability in the boundary between external reality and psychic reality. Although Jacobson
(1950, p.20) would eventually critique Federn by saying that she saw “no reason” why Federn
would differentiate ego-feeling from self-representation, in fact Federn did have a reason. “Even
the clearest knowledge of one’s own ego,” Federn wrote, “is experienced as something
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insufficient…”(1927, p.40). In patients with experiences of depersonalization, he saw that they
had a self-representation, but they did not feel with any sense of conviction that this selfrepresentation was them. In experiences of derealization, depersonalization and the loss of
psychic boundaries, Federn saw the perfect encapsulation of a breakdown in the self-self
relationship, or even a loss or disintegration of the self, rather than a distorted self-representation.
Thus, Federn postulates a healthy narcissistic cathexis that feeds the structure of the ego.5
Federn decides that the best terminology for this investment is “ego-libido” although he states
that it is not, in an ordinary healthy moment of psychic experience, gratifying—“ego feeling is
fed precisely by that part of the ego which constitutes narcissism, without, however, being autoerotically satisfied” (1927, p. 38). It is perhaps best described as a sublimation of autoerotic
cathexis into something continuous.
This gives what we might call “subject relations” the same degree of complexity as object
relations. In a particular kind of pathological narcissism, the kind characterized by the myth from
which the name derives, the subject has a libidinal investment in himself as if he were an
unattainable, idealized love object, and any object or stimulus is evaluated and defended against
according to how much it either sustains or threatens that particular idealized self-self
relationship. But, much as a person can have a relationship to someone else in which the libidinal
investment is sublimated into friendship, a parent-child relationship, or other relationships, the
investment of a relationship with oneself, which may contain love and hate, compassion and
curiosity, caretaking or abuse and neglect, and in which some moments one may not exist to
oneself or may feel oneself to be a stranger, greatly stretches the term “narcissistic.”

5

As Jacques Sedat (2005) points out, Freud himself had briefly talked about this kind of necessary narcissism that
forms the structure of the ego
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The argument can also be made that Federn’s ego-feeling is the mirror opposite of
Freud’s description of the unconscious, particularly the way it is described in his paper “The
Unconscious” (1915). Where the unconscious is timeless in Freud’s description, and the
hallucinatory wish eliminates any gap between desire and gratification, ego-feeling is defined by
the subject’s feeling that he exists in time and space. Where there is no negation in the
unconscious, ego-feeling is delineated and made possible by ego-boundaries that distinguish
subject from object, ego from id, past from present, and can even, however painfully, feel the
absence or loss of an object. Where there are no “degrees of certainty” in the unconscious,
Federn will show that it is ego-feeling that is lacking during experiences of delusional certainty.
The method of Federn’s argument seems to be exactly the same as in Freud’s paper; Freud
justifies arguing for the existence of the unconscious based on gaps in conscious synthesis,
whereas Federn studies of gaps in ego-feeling. Furthermore, both base their argument around
material from psychotic patients as a way to see the unconscious in a purer form without
mediating structures—or in Federn’s case in studying ego-feeling and ego-boundaries in
moments in which they falter or fail (1949a, 1949b, 1950). Federn’s ego-feeling is in some sense
perhaps best described as having three important features; it is (ideally) founded on a steady
cathexis of libidinal energy (at times referred to as “ego libido,” “an investment in ego feeling,”
or “healthy narcissism”), it is the “un-unconscious,” and integral to ego-feeling is the notion of
ego-boundaries, which includes experiences of internal psychic borders between ego and id as
well as borders between subject and object, inside and outside, and internal and external reality.
Though they can be separated from each other, waking ego-feeling includes mental egofeeling and bodily ego-feeling, which are synchronized and felt as a totality (1927a, p. 47). In
ordinary waking life, they are both contained within the ego and are largely indistinguishable; we
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say or think “I” and within that word we include both our psyche and our body; we say “I am
tall,” and “I am thinking about yesterday” and feel that the word “I” is connoting the same entity.
However, in sleep, or hypnagogic states, as well as in depersonalization, derealization, and
psychosis, the body ego and the psychic ego can be experienced as separate, as will be discussed
further with regard to Federn’s discussions of ego-feeling in dreams (1927b; p. 65).

Ego Boundaries and Object Relations
Inherent to Federn’s view of ego-feeling is a notion of ego-boundaries. Ego-boundaries
both define and sustain ego-feeling, even as they are themselves highly charged with sensitivity
from ego-feeling. Borrowing from Freud’s metaphor, Federn compares the ego to an amoeba (p.
184), expanding and contracting its boundaries, and feeling what is on its borders.
In beginning his discussion on dreams, Federn notes a curious observation: patients who
report feelings of derealization invariably described the experience as like a dream (1927a, p.
65). Federn found this to be surprising, because in an important respect, derealization is the
opposite of a dream experience: a dreamer is convinced that he is experiencing something
belonging to reality, when he in fact isn’t, while a person experiencing derealization is plagued
by the feeling that what he is experiencing is not real, when in fact it is. Similarly, the dreamer
may experience his dream as vivid, whereas a person in a state of derealization may find his
waking experience flat and deadened. This leads one to ask, what makes us feel that an
experience is real? And what makes us feel that an experience is vivid? Federn’s answer is that it
is the investment of energy into a sensitivity at the borders of the ego, which he terms egoboundaries. In each case-- derealization, and dreaming—the ego-boundaries are implicated.
Something is felt to be real when it is perceived to be outside of the ego-boundary; as the area of
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ego-feeling retracts in sleep, mental experiences are felt to be real because they are experienced
from outside (1927a, p. 65-70) But in moments of derealization, the investment ego-feeling
along the ego-boundaries is weakened, and the sensations are experienced as lifeless or unreal.
Boundaries constitute an immensely important role in Federn’s metapsychology, as well as his
understanding of object relations.
In Federn’s understanding, wherever a subject is capable of making an experiential
distinction, we can say that, from a metapsychological standpoint, there is an ego boundary. An
investment in ego boundaries is an investment in being able to experience a dividing line,
whether between fantasy and reality, past and present, self and object, ego, id and superego. But
importantly, as Anzieu (1985, p.87) astutely states, Federn “anticipated the notion of an
interface.” The ego boundaries feel what is outside as well as what is inside. For Federn, a
boundary is simultaneously a place of distinction and a point of contact. The border of the
United States and Canada is simultaneously the line that separates and distinguishes two separate
nations and a place of commonality where the two countries touch. There is no relating without
separateness, and the dividing line is also of existential import—to erase the border between two
countries on a map is to negate the existence of at least one of the countries as a separate entity.
Touching, feeling, or connectedness, both between structures of the mind and between the ego
and its objects, occur on these kinds of borders. Because of this, the word “border” might
perhaps be a more accurate word for Federn’s thinking than “boundary,” as “boundary”
generally has more of a connotation of keeping something out, whereas border implies both
distinction and contact, and there can be a kind of ambiguity in some border areas, a “neither
here nor there” quality. Nevertheless, in order to not create further semantic confusion, these
chapters will continue to use the term “boundary” as it has been translated.
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This theory of boundaries leads to a particular understanding of object relations that is
difficult to situate within the debates that would later arise between those who would be labeled
the drive-and-structure oriented theorists and those who would be labeled the object relations
theorists. In many ways, with Federn’s understanding, it becomes impossible to privilege one
over the other, or even fully able to distinguish the two. Federn’s idea of ego boundaries is
simultaneously intrapsychic and intersubjective. To refer to boundaries between ego, id and
superego, or the ego and its internal objects, or between one person and another, as being made
of the same ego-feeling infused boundaries is to make these phenomena profoundly related. This
larger sense of boundaries that Federn contributes is one that Glen Gabbard explicitly makes use
of in his work on boundary violations (1995, p. 1). In consulting on many cases in which a
psychoanalyst acted out sexually with a patient, Gabbard observed a collapse not only of
physical, professional and interpersonal boundaries, but also a simultaneous collapse of internal
boundaries within the analyst, such as the inability to distinguish between repetitions or
transference wishes and reality, or between transference-countertransference fantasy and action.
The ways that the ego-boundaries interact with objects in Federn’s understanding are
nuanced and particular. Federn states that some are unable to maintain the cathexis of their egoboundaries without the physical presence of their object.6 Others lose the cathexis of their ego
boundaries in the presence of an object. At times the ego boundary can become less of a dividing
line than an ambiguous area; the part of the ego that touches on an object can become identified
with that object, so that, for instance, in Federn’s version of melancholia, the part of the ego that
identifies with a dead or lost object can itself become deadened.

6

This seems like a metapsychological description of Winnicott’s famous phrase “there’s no such thing as a baby”
(1960)
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Where ego-boundaries are drawn comes to determine what internal or external
phenomena or objects are experienced as “alien.” When ego-boundaries are pulled inwards into
smaller and tighter confines, the thoughts and feelings that had previously been felt as within the
ego can become felt as outside experiences and are experienced as real. What makes an
experience “alien,” rather than simply new, Federn argues, is that it was once familiar. Every
psychotic experience, then, can be seen as like the ruins of an abandoned city, a place where ego
once was (1932, p. 515).

Psychic Pain and Defenses
It of course follows that, if a metapsychology is based around a metaphor of sensational
feeling, that not all feelings are pleasant. Federn’s (1950b) metapsychology manages psychic
pain in a way that is generalized; at times it seems synonymous with “unpleasure,” at other times
with Freud’s idea of signal anxiety, at times he seems to focus on the experience of object loss,
and at other times it could just as well apply to the phenomena that Freud includes as part of the
“repetition compulsion.” As has been mentioned, Federn took Freud’s statement that the ego was
like an amoeba quite literally, and imagines it as taking in psychic information, but also
shrinking away from painful stimuli. In his writing on the ego’s management of mental pain, he
takes this metaphor quite far indeed. The result is an understanding of negative affect and
defense that is subtly different. In comparison to Anna Freud’s (1936, p.7) metaphor for the
ego—the ego and the id are different countries, subject to different laws, and the manner of how
the ego guards its borders is what we would call the defenses-- Federn’s amoeba metaphor leads
to a slight difference. An amoeba, unlike a nation, can not only expel unwanted contents, but can
also flinch reflexively at unwanted stimuli, which disrupts the flow of associations. For Federn,
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mental pain is generally felt along the ego-boundaries, and this “pain” may be an experience of
frustration due to the lack of a pleasurable object or sensation (1950b, p. 261-264)
One factor in the ego’s response to pain is what Federn calls “ego maturity” (p.261).
Much as how it is very much a developmental achievement for an infant to be able to move its
fingers or toes rather than moving its whole body, the ego, as it matures gradually becomes more
differentiated so that an experience of mental pain can affect only one part of the ego rather than
being experienced as overwhelming and total. In discussing the difference between a neurotic
and a more psychotic response to mental pain, Federn distinguishes between pain that is
integrated into the ego and a pain that is kept outside of the ego boundary and felt as something
attacking the ego (1950b, p. 266) To take the pain into the ego is more painful in the short term,
but ultimately leads to “working through” an experience—Federn states that in doing so, the
painful content becomes integrated into ego-feeling and therefore narrative and time, whereas a
pain that is outside of the ego can continually attack the ego as something new. In a sentiment
reminiscent of Melanie Klein’s depressive position (1936), Federn states that “this is the most
elementary primary step in normal grief and normal mourning. This acceptance of pain is the
tribute we pay to normality” (1950b, p.263). For Federn clinical depression occurs when an
experience of psychic pain or loss cannot be accepted into the ego and “digested,” and therefore
continues to assault the ego-boundaries.
Though it is not a focus of his writing, in an aside (195b0, p.264), Federn reveals a
somewhat idiosyncratic idea of how defenses work. Though he agrees with Freud that the
impetus to a defense mechanism is negative affect (he generalizes it to mental pain, rather than
anxiety), he sees the anxiety and the defense as one and the same thing; the ego shrinks away
from the painful content as an automatic reflex. He states that repression does not work based on
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something in the ego “fighting off” the unwanted contents. Repression is instead the result of a
very complex process in which several things happen simultaneously. The content that arrives
from of the unconscious is converted from primary process into secondary process; at the same
time there is a hypercathexis of the boundary between the ego and reality so that there is a
turning away from internal events (and a hyperfocusing on external events as a distraction); at
the same time the ego shrinks away from the threatening contents. Perhaps what is most
interesting about this conception is that the anxious ego changes the conscious experience not by
editing the actual inner contents as they reach consciousness, but by changing its own states,
boundaries or cathexes.

The Body Ego
Though Freud had famously said that the first ego is a body ego (1923, p. 26) Federn
took this idea in his own direction. In his understanding, we have both a body (somatic) ego and
a mental (psychic) ego. And while, biologically speaking, these are the same thing (there is no
thinking or feeling self, other than what our nervous system generates), from the standpoint of
psychic experience, it cannot be taken for granted that a person psychologically feels that he
inhabits his body, or that he is his body and his body is him.
The body ego and the mental ego develop into two separate entities. During ordinary
waking life, they are so interconnected that they are felt to be the same.7 But this affinity quickly
disappears when we are tired, or intoxicated, or experiencing moments of derealization or
depersonalization. This is in part derived from Federn’s studies of dreams where he concluded
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A psychoanalytic way of understanding the positive mental health effects of exercise, yoga and meditation might
be that they bring strengthen the connection between the mental and bodily ego.
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that, though we are often confronted with personages, there is rarely very much bodily detail
about people in dreams, with the exception of certain body parts, whose emphasis is always
significant. When there is a bodily experience represented in a dream, Federn contends that there
is a particularly powerful affect or level of excitement that has to be contained by the body ego
(1927b, p. 64).
Here we see Federn codifying a line of thinking in which the body is the border between
our psychic lives and reality. In many ways, it is the ego-boundary made concrete, a way of
thinking that would be particularly developed by Anzieu in his theory of the skin-ego. If
Winnicott termed the notion of the “transitional object” (1953), one can say that, for Federn,
bodily ego feeling makes the body into a “transitional subject.” In Federn’s view, the body is a
physical fact, but only when it is claimed by our ego-feeling does it become a psychologically
inhabited body. The body is a space that must be imagined, and bodily experience becomes
represented, elaborated, and understood through early fantasy, as Freud established in the Three
Essays(1905). Objects are first registered and not distinguished from bodily sensation, and the
body becomes a psychic map of early experience. The body’s sensations become central in
organizing an understanding and representation of the object world, and out of this approach to
the world around erogenous stimulation, a more sublimated, steady cathexis in continuous
psychological proprioception is derived. But like Winnicott’s blanket, the body is both a
psychically imagined object and also an entity that belongs to reality. The blanket has a texture, a
smell, and other properties that exists outside of the infant’s imagining of them. Similarly, for
Federn, the body has very real properties and functions that exist outside of our control—
including a child’s size, physical attributes or physical illness—but it is also a psychically
represented and imagined space. Using a modern diagnostic terminology, there are a host of
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disorders and symptoms, such as somatization, hysterical symptoms, body modification, body
dysmorphia, and eating disorders, that exist in the collapse of the unity of mental and bodily egofeeling, and often even an antagonism between the two separated entities.
Every disorder or neurosis has, in Federn’s understanding, a particular disturbance in the
way that the person psychically inhabits and imagines his or her own body. Federn claims that
sadistic personalities and sex addicts, for instance, feel a constant strong ego-feeling in their
genitals, whereas masochistic personalities have not incorporated genital ego-feeling into their
body ego (1927b, p. 68). This observation perhaps helps to clarify an answer that Federn does
not directly address in his writing, that of the relationship between the kinds of considerations
that go under the category of depth psychology—drive derivatives and unconscious fantasy-- and
ego-feeling. In some case material (1927a, p. 86), Federn connects a patient’s active wishes to
periods of more active bodily feeling and passive wishes to periods of more passive bodily
feeling. We can thus surmise that Federn believed that something in the nature of the way a
person inhabits his or her body--the question of which body parts are more or less cathected than
others, and the degree of activity or passivity of a person’s bodily ego feeling may reveal the
influence of underlying wishes, memories, beliefs or fantasies. Here we can see how far Federn
goes in the direction of “the thoughts create the thinker;” the conscious, bodily experience of any
waking moment is still a production arising out of unconscious fantasy.
Perhaps most important to Federn’s understanding of severe mental illness is that he
believes it is the loss of connection to the body ego that is the beginning of a breakdown (p. 70).
Federn states that, in his experience with patients who had breakdowns, there was never a
withdrawal from the object world in which it could not first be observed that the patient had
psychically withdrawn from parts or experiences of his or her own body. The core of neurosis,
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Federn writes, in a surprising foreshadowing of Winnicott’s “Fear of Breakdown” (1974), is a
memory of a sudden “shock,” in which the ego “loses its narcissistic boundary cathexis,” and
from which full and stable ego cathexis cannot recover (1927a, p.45).

Ego Feeling in Sleep and Dreaming
In many ways, Federn saw a study of dreams and sleeping as the ultimate laboratory for
understanding the vicissitudes of ego-feeling. The instinctual life, which has to power egofeeling and ego-boundaries, must recharge itself. “It is mostly a matter of taste,” Federn writes,
“whether one says: that the ego libido vanishes (versiegt), that it is asleep, that it is withdrawn
into the id, or that it is distributed among the partial functions” (1927b, p. 70). Federn states that
certain neurotic patients, and particularly those with “premelancholia” experience great difficulty
in waking up and feeling like themselves in the morning. The transition is quite jarring, and the
reinvestment into waking ego-feeling is difficult.
Nevertheless, it is not accurate to say that there is no ego-feeling in dreams. In fact,
Federn states that where there is a dream, there is ego feeling. “As long as he is dreaming,”
Federn writes, “the dreamer feels his ego” (1927b, p. 73) Where Freud emphasizes the dream’s
function as the “guardian of sleep,” Federn relatedly sees the work of dreaming in part as a
protection against a decathexis or a total loss of ego feeling, a guardian against what would later
be termed annihilation anxiety. The dream activity assures the dreamer that he still exists.
Furthermore, there is almost always ego-feeling present in the dream content; the dream
narrative almost always has some kind of “I” from within whose vantage point the dreamer
experiences (or in some instances watches at a distance) the events. This “I” is generally felt to
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be identical with the waking person, and this is rarely questioned. Similarly, the continuity of this
ego-experience is never questioned; the “I” that we feel we are in waking life and the “I” that we
feel we are in dreams is felt to be the same person, with the same subjectivity. We may inhabit
an entirely different reality in these two instances, but we generally feel ourselves to be the same
subject.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of recharging, there is as little ego-feeling as possible
during sleep. The unconscious and preconscious processes, which contribute to the manifest
content, strike against the ego boundary, and only the part of the ego-boundary which is struck
awakens. It is because the content strikes the largely withdrawn ego from outside of the ego
boundary that it is felt to be real (1927b, p. 65).
Although there is some ego-feeling on the part of the dreamer, it is largely mental egofeeling. While dreaming, we rarely dream a bodily sensation, nor do the other characters in our
dreams have particularly detailed or well-remembered bodily attributes. When bodily ego-feeling
does become represented in a dream it is generally a sign of a powerful affect or fantasy that the
partially-awakened mental ego alone cannot contain while allowing the dreamer to continue to
sleep (1927b. 80).
This bodily ego-feeling, according to Federn, can be either “passive” or “active.”
Passive bodily-ego feeling occurs when there is a predominance of fear, shame, masochism, and
exhibitionism. In order to account for active bodily ego feeling, Federn has to add a new concept
to his theory: the will8. Within the unconscious, there are wishes. In the ego, when a wish is
sanctioned and the subject has the intent and permission to act on it, Federn terms this the will.

8

I feel that “intention” may be a better translation
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Thus, in order for bodily ego feeling in a dream to include an act, it has to not only be sanctioned
by the ego but allowed also by the body ego. There is, ordinarily, a high barrier in either dreams
or waking life for an act to be permitted to be carried out by the body. Frequently, due to a
conflict with the superego, the act becomes transformed into immobility, and the dream becomes
an inhibition dream. At times an act may be carried out in a dream that is not sanctioned in the
ego, and then it can be said that the underlying wish is to be able to carry out that act (1927b,
89).
It is easy to see Federn’s studies of ego-feeling in dreams contributing to a more general
view of how the psyche works in waking life. We can see that there is a self-representation, but
that ego-feeling is dispersed much more widely. “The ego can enjoy, can fear, can dislike, can
doubt the dream,” Federn writes. “The ego can may look at the dream as at a movie or play9, or
in other dreams the ego itself plays a part on the dream stage” (p.77). Moreover, to continue with
the movie analogy, the notion of ego has to be large enough to encapsulate both the agency that
receives the internal stimulation (the projector or perhaps screen), the screenwriter or director,
the reactive audience, and the protagonist of the dream. All of these lay claim to “I” when we
discuss ourselves dreaming. This must carry over into the fantasies that underpin waking life
(1927b). Here is another justification for Federn’s argument that self-representation, separated
from “ego,” is not sufficient.

Ego-Feeling and Psychosis

9

Here we can see Federn’s influence on Lewin’s (1960) theory of the “dream screen.”
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Federn was the first psychoanalyst to work with psychotic patients, and was well known
and respected for this work (E. Federn, 1988, p. 125). His metapsychology was formed out of,
and formed the framework for, his technique with psychotic patients. Federn saw psychotic
illness as reflecting an impoverished cathexis, rather than a hypercathexis, of libidinal investment
in the ego. This lack, or loss, of cathexis may be caused by various internal and external
circumstances and configurations. Because he largely stays with phenomenology and avoids
etiology, there is room for any combination of conflict and deficit theories to account for this.
The psychic energy may have been transferred, neutralized, or there may have been a shortage.
This can be caused by either psychological or biological factors: In the psychiatric language of
his time, Federn recognized cases as being either a “disease” or a “syndrome,” with some
psychotic presentations seeming more to be what we might term as psychological in nature and
others more psychiatric. These differing etiologies were not irrelevant-- Federn wrote that they
could greatly determine the prognosis-- but he did believe that they led to the same psychic state
(1950, p. 117).
Regardless of the cause, the loss of cathexis forces the ego to shrink inwards in order to
“economize” and preserve what ego-feeling is left (similar to the configuration of ego-feeling
during sleep). Thus, the internal sensations and feelings, which had been previously felt to exist
within the ego’s borders, are now felt to be outside the ego, as the ego has shrunken inwards. It
also causes the ego-boundaries to falter and at times fail. The result is an inability to distinguish
between internal and external reality. Thus, in instances of paranoid certainty, what might be a
fantasy, thought or trial action becomes experienced as something belonging to the external
world (1950b, p. 207). There is both a deficiency in the ego boundary as well as a collapse of the
ability to play with multiple possibilities or hypotheses. The thought is both experienced as real,
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and is also experienced as if no other possible explanation or interpretation could exist. Here
there is a spectrum in which the “false certainty” felt by the paranoiac can give way to the “false
reality” experienced by the schizophrenic (1950a). They are largely a matter of degree; “false
certainty” is merely a “change in judgments about the world,” whereas “false reality” is the
“substitution of a false world for a real one” (p. 231).
Federn considers “false reality” to be an early stage of schizophrenic illness. The next
stage is one he describes as “regressive narcissistic fusion.” This is an ego regression back to a
more infantile state in which ego, id, and external world are not distinguished. For Federn,
maturation occurs due to both biological and emotional development and greater differentiation
and flexibility within the mental and bodily ego. But earlier ego-states, based around
configurations of ego-feeling, ego-functioning and object relations from earlier developmental
periods remain in states of repression. Due to the collapse of ego-boundaries, the there is an
undoing of the countercathexes that keep earlier ego-states in a state of repression (this is
Federn’s understanding of regression). Psychic past and psychic present no longer hold any
experiential distinction (1949a). In Federn’s system, to ask why the ego regresses to an infantile
state is somewhat backwards. For Federn, the archaic ego-states are inevitable and ever-present
(if kept under repression), and it is the mature ego-state which requires constant psychic energy
to maintain. Mature healthy ego functioning is the exception in mental life, even if those who are
relatively healthy are able to convince themselves that it is the rule (1949a).
The connection between the body ego and the mental ego is severed or severely taxed.
The feeling of having, out of all of the varied ego-states, feelings, thoughts and memories, a
unified ego, the feeling that we know who we are talking about when we say “I,” can only be
sustained by the cathexis of ego-feeling. The loss of this, in psychosis, leads to the ego breaking
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up into its disconnected and component parts and identifications. The psychosis also permeates
the preconscious processes, making tasks and mental abilities that had been largely automatic
suddenly difficult (1949b).

Ego-Feeling and Clinical Technique

Federn’s explicit contribution to technique is largely in the area of work with psychotic
patients. This was both an area of considerable experience and expertise for Federn, and also an
area where there was the least amount of orthodoxy, as so little had been established and these
patients were largely seen to be outside of the scope of treatment by means of the psychoanalytic
method (E. Federn 1962, p. 125). Federn was not a developmentalist, nor was his theory a “twoperson” or object relations theory, by today’s standards. Nevertheless, he understood the cause of
paranoia, psychotic illness and even pathological narcissism to lie within an insufficient
investment of libido in the ego, a narcissistic deficiency. He therefore understood that his work
with these patients was to leverage the method of psychoanalysis—and the transference
relationship-- towards psychic re-growth and stability rather than towards insight(1947, p. 166).
Implied is that there is some form of a contribution or support by either the clinician or the
setting that allows the patient to re-cathect his ego.
Because his papers on psychosis have plentiful clinical material, they give a degree of
evidence towards what his clinical approach may have looked like (1948, 1950a, 1950b). In his
experience working with psychotic patients, Federn found that many practitioners who practiced
more supportive, “pseudo-psychoanalytic” approaches had better success with psychotic
patients, although only up to a certain point (1948, p. 122). Federn came to believe that more
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disturbed patients needed therapeutic conditions that could allow for a greater cathexis of egofeeling. This included the full support of family members (only if they had a relatively
unconflicted relationship with the patient) and home aides (1948, p. 120). He recommended a
combination of insight along with what he called “use of the transference (1947, p. 171)”
Federn’s discussion of using the transference is perhaps the most ubiquitous feature of his
discussions of clinical technique, although it is never referenced or explained at length. While it
may seem that he is advocating what would have been called a “transference cure,” he seems to
be talking about something more nuanced and complicated. It seems that what he is advocating is
for the practitioner to allow for a transference relationship to be created by the patient which
would allow the patient to recathect his or her ego boundaries and ego feeling (1948, p.160).
With depressed patients, who Federn believed had never learned to fully integrate negative affect
into the ego, Federn states that the patient must learn this basic childhood capacity through a
regression in the transference (1950c, p.269). In work with delusional patients, Federn stressed
the therapist’s need to be continually curious with the patient about how he arrived at his
conclusions, as if to free up the ego-feeling that could come if this delusional reality could again
be experienced as one possible thought (1950b, p. 207). While Federn is not advocating for a
“transference cure” he is advocating for the use of the transference for something other than
interpretation and insight, at least for a long period in the analysis of more severely ill patients. It
seems that Federn saw a benign, positive transference relationship as a necessary background to
the treatment that would allow for psychic growth in the patient and the establishment (or reestablishment) of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries. It would probably not be until Winnicott
(1955) and Balint (1979) that this kind of regression in the transference towards psychic growth
could be more fully articulated.
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Conclusion
As can hopefully be seen above, Federn’s metapsychology offers a complex,
phenomenological approach to the ego and its fluctuations, its connection to the body ego, its
work in managing mental pain, and negotiating its borders with reality, the id and objects. By
taking the ego as a subjective, felt unity of mental and bodily feeling, Federn is able to point to
an area of experience and of anxieties, that of finding and losing oneself, of falling into a kind of
entropy into one’s component parts, that psychoanalysis would take several decades to be able to
integrate and think about.
This leads to a fresh approach to dreams, embodiment, and understandings of depression,
narcissism, psychosis, and clinical technique. This approach constitutes an essentially Freudian
approach to subjectivity and its gaps, with clear and immediate clinical utility in describing and
understanding patients’ experiences and clinical material.
As Chapter 3 will show, although Federn faded into obscurity, his influence and ideas
nevertheless found their way into subsequent generations of psychoanalysts, who would enrich
his ideas by putting them in the context of the analytic setting, finding etiological factors in
infant development, and broaden his areas of focus and interest.
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Chapter 3: From Ego-Feeling to the True Self: Early Development and the
Experience of Having an Essential Core
“There is a great deal of narcissistically invested libido stored up in all these ego states,
with their potentially actual or potentially ready attitudes, reactions, contents, and boundaries.
These are, as was mentioned above, the countercathexes which permit the ego to cathect objects
with sufficient stability and to endure frustrations from them. What we call “inner resources” “to
be at peace with oneself,” and “equanimity” rest on these narcissistically gratifying inner
cathexes in the ego states which, though past, are ready to be awakened.”
--Paul Federn, “On the Distinction Between Healthy and Pathological Narcissism (1950e,
p. 332)”
“I too am untranslatable”
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” (1855, p.96)

Federn’s psychoanalytic contributions, which we have outlined in the previous chapter,
more or less emanate from a single idea, with vast ramifications for both psychoanalytic theory
and practice. This idea is that the ego may have various functions and be thought of in structural
terms, but it is an experience, or more specifically a fluctuating area of experience. This moves
the ego from the area of metapsychology (postulated universal inherent structures and forces in
the mind) into psychology (individual mental experiences). For Federn, the ego exists in as much
as we feel it to exist (1926, p. 25). Without that feeling, a bundle of functions of the kind that an
intelligence test would reflect may exist, but they work to bolster and defend an empty or

69

psychotic core. Federn then borrows some of Freud’s metapsychological principles to explain the
fragility and lack of fixity in our ego-feeling (1927, p. 38). It requires a libidinal investment of
energy, which, as it is directed toward the self, we would call narcissistic libido. Moreover,
steady waking ego-feeling involves a feeling of mind and body unity(1927b, p. 64). Federn’s
ego-feeling therefore implies a relation to oneself that exists spatially—more or less within the
boundaries of the body, though this can fluctuate—but also temporally. Ego-feeling involves a
relation to oneself across time. To have ego-feeling is to have the psychological experience of
being able to conceive of a past, present and future as oneself and to feel in a deep way that all of
these iterations of oneself are oneself. In our current language, we can understand Federn to be
saying that we may in different moments have different self-states (Bromberg, 1996), moods, or
proclivities, not to mention personal maturation and development so that we can look back on
our earlier self as being less developed, but there is some thread across time, stringing these all
together as part of a common self-experience. Federn’s theory of ego-feeling is a set of close
clinical observations of psychotic or regressed adult patients, as well as himself and others in
sleeping and hypnagogic states, understanding ego-feeling in part from the moments when it
shifts or breaks down. Even in the fluctuations that he noted, Federn did not try to systematically
account for an etiology for these instabilities, citing some unknown or varying combination of
psychological and innate factors. Federn was no ambitious metapsychologist or theorist, nor was
he a developmentalist. The aim of Federn’s theorizing was not to account for ego-feeling beyond
a phenomenological account of it and an “economic” explanation of the narcissistic libidinal
investment from which it derives itself.
This chapter aims to situate Federn within an intellectual history of psychoanalysis, while
simultaneously synthesizing the contributions of important later psychoanalysts who, though
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from different countries and utilizing different vocabularies, continued and elaborated upon the
work of Paul Federn. In particular, a synthesis of these theories creates a broader theoretical
foundation for Federn’s idea of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries, to some extent connecting them
to both the instincts and to object-relational and relational aspects of psychic development, while
at the same time locating the foundation of ego-feeling within the first year of life. This will
primarily focus on the work of Winnicott and the ways that understanding Freud, Winnicott,
Federn, and larger psychoanalytic concerns can be illuminated by examining this heretofore
unremarked upon influence. It will also include contributions from Bertram Lewin, Didier
Anzieu and Hans Loewald.
It is possible to trace a direct line from Freud, through Federn, to a trend in thinking
picked up and elaborated by these four analysts. As he charted the fluctuations in ego-feeling in
his psychotic adult patients toward developing his psychology of the ego, he alone was keeping
alive the more radical implication of Freud’s middle period—the implications of “On
Narcissism” (1914), “Mourning and Melancholia” (1915), and several other papers from around
that time (for the purposes of this paper this idea can be termed “the thoughts create the thinker”
as elaborated in Chapter 2)-- and, relatedly, that the ego is “propped up” on, and elaborated from,
bodily experience (Freud, 1905; Anzieu, 1985). The work of the following generation would be
to integrate ego-feeling into a larger theory, one connecting ego-feeling to object relations and to
the instincts, as well as to develop the developmental etiology of either healthy or fragile egofeeling. This subsequent work occurred, despite Federn’s descent into obscurity, but it occurred
across a sort of invisible tradition. The most important link here is perhaps the one between
Federn and Winnicott. There is some evidence of contact between the two, but this paper is
hypothesizing a much deeper dialogue that continued below the surface, and continued after
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Federn’s death. What is being proposed here is that Winnicott, after an early meeting with
Federn, exposure to his written work, and a subsequent letter, continued a (perhaps unconscious)
conversation with Federn for decades, and eventually had his full answer in a number of
monographs written from the late 1950’s until his death in 1971. Within this scaffolding, we can
understand the contributions of two other post-Federnians, Bertram Lewin and Didier Anzieu
(both explicitly influenced by Federn) as providing an early narrative of the preverbal
development of ego-feeling in the first year of life. These narratives are enriched by Loewald’s
(1978) understanding of primary process and its relationship to language. Though Loewald
references Federn in several papers, his connection is substantially less direct than that of the
others. But as a psychoanalyst who presented a different approach within American ego
psychology based around personal and creative but very deep readings of Freud, Loewald in
many ways represented a resurgence within American psychoanalysis of some of the lines of
thinking that had been dropped not when Federn’s contribution was forgotten.10 The basic
premise of this subsequent generation is that it is in the context of what we might describe as the
caregiver’s participation with the infant in an ongoing matrix of imaginative elaborations and
collaborations, centered around the meeting of the infant’s psychosomatic needs, and the
registrations and internalizations of this dyadic process within the infant’s developing ego and
body-ego, that we can locate the beginning of an imaginative proprioception that allows the
infant to transition into becoming an individual with an inside and outside and a history in the
world of separate, whole individuals. Moreover, this allows the infant to do this without losing
the vitality and creativity that sustains ego-feeling as something real, personal and meaningful.
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Chodorow (2021) has delineated an “American Independent” tradition of “intersubjective ego psychology” in the
United States, citing Loewald and Erickson as its founders. Perhaps Federn can be seen as a precursor.
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This line of thinking locates the development of ego-feeling within the infant’s registration and
elaboration of his own psychosomatic experiences in the first year of life within the infantcaregiver relationship. From these later theories, we can also come to see that the ego, which is
elaborated from what Freud called “that first ego…the body ego”(Freud, 1923, p. 126) bears the
trace of this early body ego in that it comes to have an outward surface (ego-boundary) based
upon the skin, face and voice, and an inner core, based upon digestion and the taking in of the
object and good experiences with the object. This sense of having a deep inside core of the self,
which is felt to be one’s “center” and an outward facing ego which simultaneously represents the
self to the object world and feels the inner world, lends greater specificity to Federn’s egofeeling. Moreover, it allows for the notion psychic health and stability can be understood as the
feeling that the outward facing representation to the object world and the inner personal core
have something to do with each other, and are related, whereas in illness ranging from neurotic
to psychotic, the ego-boundaries and the ego-core are unable to connect and communicate, and
may be felt to have little to do with each other.
For Federn, ego-feeling is a sense of integration in space and continuity in time. It defines
itself in part through its boundaries, and therefore through experiences of having an outside and
an inside, and through a unity of mental and of bodily ego-feeling. We can further understand
Federn to articulate that the unconscious, instinctual and fantasy life not only power but also
influence the shape and phenomenological experience of an individual’s ego-feeling. In the work
of Winnicott, Lewin and Anzieu, we can find the sources of every one of these components of
ego-feeling in the parent-infant relationship of the first year of life. In keeping with the notion of
the psychosomatic partnership, we will examine the ways that the infant’s psychically elaborated
experiences with the caregiver through the medium of the face and voice, the skin, and the inner
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world (at first beginning with digestion) become organized into the beginnings of a personal egofeeling, a true self, and with the addition of the idea not only of ego-boundaries but also an egocore or center.
Ego-Feeling and the True Self
In 1949, Winnicott wrote the following letter to Paul Federn, the only available
documentation of any relationship or correspondence they may have had (Winnicott, 2018, p. 12)

Dear Dr. Federn
I have only just read your lectures on Psychoanalysis of psychoses 194311 and I am writing to
say that I have very much enjoyed them. The wealth of clinical experience behind them is so
clear. I am very much wanting to have a copy of these for re-reading as the copy I read was a
photostat belonging to the U.S. Army. If you happen to have a reprint I would be very grateful if
you would send me one. Alternatively I can order a copy of the Psychiatric Quarterly from the
publishers. In a week or two I hope to be able to send you a reprint of a lecture of my own on
another aspect of the same subject.
You may remember me as the young analyst who never wrote to thank you for taking such a
lot of trouble over an article I wrote a long time ago on play or some such subject. That article
was written under the influence of Melitta Schmideberg when I was quite unready to write on the
theme. The whole thing seemed to me rather unreal at the time and it took me many years to get
it into perspective. When you came to England you said to me that this must represent a strong
negative transference which had got caught on to yourself. I think this was not correct; there was
another explanation, which was that I had been persuaded to do something which was not really
part of me and which I really resented.
With good wishes,
Yours very sincerely,
11

This is a paper that Federn published in The Psychiatric Quarterly. It partly forms the basis for the chapter in Ego
Psychology and the Psychoses that is titled “Psychoanalysis of Psychoses.” Weiss states that this chapter was
compiled by a process in which the 1943 paper was “edited and combined with an earlier report from the
International Journal of Psychoanalysis to avoid repetition of material.”
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D. W. Winnicott.

While the letter leaves more questions than answers, a few important deductions can be
gleaned. Winnicott must have sensed Federn to be a kindred spirit. He did not have to write the
letter, as he could just as easily have retrieved Federn’s paper by ordering it from the Psychiatric
Quarterly. We can surmise that Federn must have left a meaningful impression on Winnicott for
Winnicott to be writing about the meeting that they had had, and that his paper on the psychoses
must also have left an impression for Winnicott to remember it six years later and want to re-read
it. While Winnicott’s influences were many, there is an underlying assumption around the nature
of the ego in his work—that it cannot be taken for granted, either developmentally or in moment
to moment existence, that in health it is closely related to the body, and that it can be lost or
annihilated—that at this time could be found nowhere else but in Federn’s work in so organized
and explicit a form.
It is unlikely there was any further correspondence. Within a few months of the writing of
this letter, Winnicott would have had his first coronary (Kahr, personal correspondence) and
within a year Federn would have died. But this paper considers the possibility that Federn
became an internal interlocutor for Winnicott, and that his theories over the next several decades
would be, in part, a conversation with Federn. While it cannot be proved, this paper is
hypothesizing the idea (or at least that it may be profitable to imagine) that Winnicott’s paper
“Ego Distortions in Terms of True and False Self” (1960), is Winnicott’s answer to Paul Federn,
the one he had promised in the letter, albeit decades later. In this hypothesis, long after Federn’s
death, Winnicott, consciously or unconsciously, continued his conversation with Federn until he
at last had a a fully formulated answer and a contribution to Federn, one that was truly his own,
rather than the “unready” work he had shown Federn previously. The parallels between Federn
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and Winnicott are quite notable; by the time he wrote his early paper “Primitive Emotional
Development (1945, p.149)” Winnicott already had his own version of ego-feeling, using various
words such as “integration,” “realization” and “personalization,” and soon adding “psyche-soma
(1954, p. 243)” and “going-on-being (1956, p. 587)” to represent different equivalent aspects of
Federn’s holistic notion of ego-feeling. It can certainly be said that Winnicott was always adding
an early history to what Federn had called ego-feeling, but in a series of papers published during
the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, Winnicott had developed the idea of a personal core, or a “true
self” (1960, p. 140) based in the early parent-infant matrix. Federn had himself gestured at the
idea that ego-feeling may have a “center” in several of his papers, such as in the opening quote,
but it was never discussed in so clear a form as Winnicott’s “true self,” or “incommunicado
core” (1963, p. 188).
To put Winnicott’s paper “Ego Distortions in Terms of True and False Self (1960)” in
conversation with Federn, we can say that Winnicott is adding the observation that ego-feeling
can be faked, both to the outside world and even to the subject himself. Where Federn saw a
failure of ego-feeling in patients who experience depersonalization or derealization, Winnicott
saw the failure of a pathological organization that had been functioning as a facade to resemble
ego-feeling. A subject can create a false mind-body unity across space and time; the “I” that they
have constructed or co-constructed to project out into the world does not feel like a
representative of who the person really is. It is often based around containing, defending against,
or making reparations for the impulses and needs of an early object, rather than around one’s
own impulses and needs. But this artificial substitute feels artificial, both to the person who has
created it and often to others, and as such it is fragile; the feeling of personalization and
realization is always missing or incomplete. Federn had gone to great lengths to note the fragility
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of ego-feeling in his patients, but Winnicott supplied the notion that that patient’s ego-feeling
may have been fragile because it was constructed on a false basis to begin with, for the purpose
of hiding and protecting the true ego-feeling.
Winnicott states that understanding the development of true self experiences requires an
understanding of both the id-needs and the ego-needs of the infant. The development of a stable
and relatively accessible “true self” has to do not only with the caregiver’s meeting of the
infant’s instinctual needs, but in doing so such a way that allows the infant to slowly build up the
ego-organization to take ownership of them. To Winnicott’s infant, who has not yet developed
ego-feeling, the instincts do exist, but they are “not yet defined as internal to the infant.” They
are “as external as a clap of thunder.” But this state of affairs is always developing. “The
infant’s ego is building up strength and in consequence is getting towards a state in which iddemands will be felt as part of the self, and not environmental.” The question then, is not only
the meeting of the instincts, but the development of the experience of having a self with an inside
that can be felt to contain them. When the infant can contain the instincts and feel them to be his
own, then they become “a very important strengthener of the ego, or of the True Self (1960
p.141).” Here we can draw a direct parallel between Federn’s understanding of the libidinal
cathexis of ego-feeling, and Winnicott’s understanding of the instincts as a strengthener of the
ego when they can be gradually gathered up by the infant within his area of omnipotence. In
health, the vitality of the instinctual life powers the experience of ego-feeling or the true self.
Winnicott’s primary and ongoing contribution to ego-feeling had always been that what
he had been that this self-self relationship is an outgrowth and internalization of the parent-infant
relationship (1945, 1960). This is perhaps the most basic assumption underlying all of his work.
But in “Ego Distortions in Terms of True and False Self (1960),” Winnicott supplies something
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of the paradoxical mechanism by which this happens. The infant supplies a “spontaneous
gesture,” and the parent meets or does not meet it reliably. The infant’s spontaneous gesture is
arrived at in a way that is closer to the creative process of artists and writers than to the
secondary process spoken communication of adults. In the latter, there is a formulated,
delineated thought that has then to be communicated in an organized way to the other person,
whereas the communication of the creative person is simultaneously a discovery of what it is that
he is communicating, something that is perhaps never fully known to him. The infant is like the
painter who paints to discover his inner experience in real time, and if it is good or satisfying and
representative of his inner experience he will know it when he sees it. But for the infant, this is in
reality (but not necessarily to the infant’s experience if all is going well) a two-person process. If
the infant represents the half-formulated creative process of a painter who approaches the blank
canvas with a sense of spontaneity, a feeling that he has an inner potential for expression and
something that needs to be expressed, that he does not and cannot fully understand, then the
caregiver is the painter’s hand, artistic training and artistic ability that makes it happen in
actuality. The result of this two-people-working-as-one process is the infant’s symbolized
thought-in-reality. The materialization of the wished-for experience gives form and meaning to
the spontaneous wish-expressing gesture. The implicit lesson the infant has learned is that his
thoughts and impulses are real, and, by extension, so is he. The two have worked together not
only to satisfy a need but to have a complete experience of having a thought. Here is how the ego
“becomes strengthened” enough to contain the needs and eventually to feel them as an internal
event. This whole process and relationship becomes gradually internalized into what we will call
the ego, which envelops and contains the instincts. The capacity to form a full representation of
the wish, the beginning of dreaming and of thinking, and eventually the capacity to think about,
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alter, and change or repress this wish in line with other demands (compromise formation), as
well as the sense of being an “I” begins here.
But, of course, all of this implies a paradox. The foundation of ego-feeling lies in an early
period of experiencing something that is the opposite of ego-feeling. The hungry infant who
hallucinates the breast and has the breast materialize so reliably that he does not have to deal
with the difference between wish and reality is not in a world of space or time, which imply
distinction, distance and frustration, nor does he have to deal with the difference between internal
experience or external reality, nor between self and object. In a world of instant hallucinatory
summoning of objects, there is, as in the unconscious, no negation and no time (Freud, 1915).
When this is well enough approximated by the environment, the infant is protected from the
burdens of ego-feeling. This is not merely a developmental stage an infant must pass through due
to an immature ego. This experience forms the basis of the true self, the personal spark that rests
at the core of ego-feeling.

The Experience of Having a Core
To this reading, the notion of the false self is a clinically useful phenomenon, one that
resonates easily with other theoretical models and personal experience. But the notion of the true
self is far more mysterious, and potentially theoretically revolutionary. Winnicott was quite right
in the opening of his paper to connect this idea to religion and mysticism (1960, p. 141); it verges
on the idea of having a soul.
Although one can imagine that the idea of having a core or a center comes naturally from
Federn’s notion of ego-feeling, it is not something he discusses at length. His idea of egoboundaries is a spatial metaphor, but ego-feeling itself is something more of a feeling of
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continuity in time. When we are feeling awake, embodied, attuned to both internal and external
reality while knowing the difference, feel we exist continuously in space and time and reality, we
have ego-feeling (Federn, 1926). This feeling is said to exist in a kind of psychically delineated
space, defined by boundaries which can fluctuate, but in health are mostly within the boundaries
of the body. Certainly, varied ego-states are provoked, but these are felt, or not felt, to belong to
our ego-feeling. This line of thinking is seen as well in the epigraph, taken from Federn’s 1935
paper, “On the Difference Between Healthy and Pathological Narcissism,” where Federn
discusses the idea of having a core of early, satisfying experiences that sustains ego-feeling
(1935, p. 332).
But for Winnicott, the true self has to do with the experience that one’s self or personality
has an essential center that is, paradoxically, a remnant of a state from before ego-feeling. For
the person who had a good enough early environment there is, at the core of ego-feeling, the
early, merged state of the satisfied infant with his object. The separation and aloneness implied
in ego-feeling, the terrible burden and inherent narcissistic loss in being an individual, is only
bearable with a core of early satisfactory merger with the object that lies at the center of the ego.
Winnicott is most explicit about this center in his paper “On Communicating and Not
Communicating Leading to a Certain Study of Opposites (1963).” Here he explicitly states that
“in health, there is a core to the personality that corresponds to the split self of the true
personality; I suggest that this core never communicates with the world of perceived objects and
that the individual person knows it must never be communicated with or be influenced by
external reality.” In this “incommunicado” core, the subject “communes silently with his internal
objects,” an inner space that is “sacred” and must never be violated (p. 187).
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A direct link can be drawn here to Lewin’s (1946) theory of the oral triad and the dream
screen. Lewin begins with the oral triad-- three inherently connected wishes that form together in
the instinctual life of the early infant in the oral phase: to eat, to be eaten, and to sleep. For Lewin
the prototype of the dream is the infant who falls asleep at the breast. The infant, in the course of
feeding, experiences several changes in his ego-feeling, eventually merging with the breast or
mother, and as such not only taking in but also experiencing himself as being taken in by an
enveloping presence. While Lewin notes that the wish to eat and to sleep are observable by the
infant who falls asleep at the breast, the wish to “be eaten” is admittedly a “heuristic
construction,” based on the content of regressive experiences and phobic symptoms, around
which he had written his first papers.
But it is in these experiences that the infant, exhausted by the process he has just
undergone, and now quiet and calm, falls asleep and, bolstered by the fullness he now has inside
of him, is able to dream. Lewin utilizes Federn to explain this phenomenon:
That the ego boundaries are lost in sleep and dreams we know, due to Federn’s classic
(1932) paper. I should like to utilize Federn’s discovery to support my contention that the
dreamer, or sleeper, remains in unified contact with the breast, and that this determines constant
characteristics of the dream, such as the dream screen…the sleeper has identified himself with
the breast and has eaten and retained all the parts of himself…in short the sleeper has lost his
ego-boundaries because when he went to sleep he became united with the breast. (p.94)

The seemingly endless ways that these experiences and wishes manifest in adult fantasies,
phobias and symptoms around eating, sleeping, and even death and suicide are numerous and
explicated by Lewin over the course of several papers (1946; 1948; 1953). For our purposes
here, however, we can ascertain something about the way that the repetitive act of the infant
losing his ego-boundaries in an inter-merging experience of taking in, being taken in, having the
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caregiver inside of him and being inside of the caregiver gives way to the capacity for dreaming,
with the internalized breast as a blank screen --reminiscent of Anzieu’s “skin-breast” (1985, p.
39)--on which the infant can project his dreams, an internal object that the dream is being shared
with—in which a dream or fantasy can occur. This area of experience is retained within the
adult’s capacity to dream. We can say that for Lewin, dreaming is always dreaming-with, a
communion with a primitive early object. Here we can see the parallel to Winnicott’s silent core,
in which the subject is always silently communing with early objects. The imaginative
elaborations of an attuned environment create the conditions for the developing subject to retain
an early satisfactory experience at the core of his ego, and this internal core, itself a wish
fulfilment fantasy, also creates the conditions for dreaming.
One last parallel to be drawn here is to Loewald’s (1976) understanding of primary
process and its relationship to language. Though in the adult psyche, language, or a wordpresentation, can be linked to a thing-presentation in the preconscious, Loewald makes the point
that in early childhood, the voice of the mother speaking to the child is yet another thingpresentation (p. 182). The primary process is primary, according to Loewald, not only in a
developmental sense, but in a “deeper” sense, corresponding to a form of mentation and
experience in which distinctions and differentiations do not exist, a primary unity, or, in
Loewald’s language, an original “density” (p. 196). Any translation of this into discrete thought
or language has already transformed this into the secondary process, in which duality,
differentiation and linearity predominate. This corresponds to Winnicott’s incommunicado self,
and Lewin’s dream screen, as a primitive core that lies at the center of the ego. In a kind of
paradox, ego-feeling, which is defined as a continuity in time and space, and which creates the
conditions for differentiation, individuation and the secondary process, is sustained by a core
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comprised of something very much the opposite, a kind of merger, communion, and primal
density.
Hallucinatory Experience and the Discovery of Ego-Boundaries
We now understand the “baby at the breast” moment that Lewin and many others have
discussed as a powerful encapsulation of the moment where the infant’s ruthless pleasureseeking pull meets with maternal holding and attunement, where self, drive and object, internal
fantasy and external caregiving situation, and the development and loss of ego-boundaries in the
presence of an internally and externally enveloping object all meet in a profoundly
overdetermined moment. All of these factors are of course present to varying degrees at many
other moments in the infant-caregiver relationship. Nevertheless, it is in this same moment that
Lewin sees in the development of dreaming that Winnicott comes to see as the development of
“object use” in his paper “The Use of an Object (1969).” Winnicott, in this paper, distinguishes
between “object relating” and “object usage,” with “object relating” referring to an experience of
the object as a subjective phenomenon that exists as a figment of one’s need or wish-fulfilment
hallucination, and “object usage” referring to an appreciation of the object’s existence outside of
oneself: “the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of
shared reality...(p. 88). This is developed because the object repeatedly “survives” the instinctual
pleasure-seeking ruthlessness of the infant, as well as the de-cathexis of the satisfied infant, who,
as Lewin illustrates, has taken everything into itself, and has now de-cathected the now useless
external world in its satisfied, merged sleep. And yet, ideally, the breast and the mother and the
world have a habit of “surviving.” Perhaps the infant wakes up to realize that they have never
left, even if he has gone into his world of dreams and communion with the object he has taken in.
A thing that cannot be destroyed in one’s mind (or swallowed and kept permanently and totally
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inside one’s own ego-boundaries) must, after all, belong to external reality. This is the
experience through which ego-boundaries are discovered, along with the reality beyond. With
this comes the discovery that the object can be placed outside of the ego-boundaries as
something that belongs to the external world, and has properties and an existence of its own.
This object therefore comes to have an external existence, as belonging to reality, as well as an
internal representation.
From Ego-Boundaries to Ego-Borders: Attunement and the Transitional Role of the
Face, Voice and Skin
The ego-core has been described by Winnicott, Lewin and Loewald in their differing
terminologies as a space of merger, or unity, where the dream screen or breast is present on
which to project the dream thoughts, a sacred, protected place where we commune with objects.
Winnicott’s theory of the inner isolate core, that untranslatable inner space of the true self that
we protect from exploitation, where we hold on to, in Lewin’s conceptualization, the addressee
of our dreamlife, that primal density that Loewald writes of, is simultaneously what makes egofeeling bearable—it is after all the remnant of a primary narcissistic state from before egofeeling—but it has its own terrible burden attached to it. It must be isolated and protected and,
moreover, it does not easily find its way into the kind of language or concerns pertaining to adult
conversation. It may be preserving an early merged state with others, but it is an early experience
that is incommunicable. It comes with the ultimate isolation of the individual. This would be a
tragic set-up, if it were not for two areas of phenomena that are closely interrelated, although
they are rarely discussed together. Though what has come to be called attunement (Stern, 1985,
p. 87) and the ability to participate in a “transitional” (Winnicott, 1954, p.8 ) space with an infant
are two conceptually different phenomena (with the former being far more measurable in infant
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research), I argue that in Winnicott the two are inextricable. One cannot be “attuned” to the
infant or early toddler without on some level participating in their transitional world. What
makes the feeding situation “alive” and “meaningful” is the capacity of the mother and infant to
“live an experience together (1945, p. 152).” Moreover, both are, for the infant, crucial in the
same way for a certain kind of ego-boundary to be formed, one in which the ego-boundary is felt
to be a shared border rather than a harsh boundary, and one that in fact has a wide border area
where both similarity and commonality are featured as much as distinction and difference. In this
sense, what has come to be described as “transitional phenomena” or a “transitional space,”
“attunement,” and even the more current focus on “intersubjectivity” are different approaches to
a similar orientation of the ego-boundaries within a dyad.
Transitional phenomena are transitional in several ways. They are transitional in the
sense of occurring at a transitional stage in development, between infancy and toddlerhood, in
promoting the transition towards “unit status (1960, p. 590)” that the toddler begins to grapple
with, and also in occupying that transitional space between the internal world and external
reality. The transitional object, after all, is not an internal object, nor does it belong fully to
external reality. “When symbolism is employed,” Winnicott writes, “the infant is already
distinguishing between fantasy and fact, between inner objects and external objects, between
primary creativity and perception.” But the term transitional object “gives room for the process
of being able to accept difference and similarity” (p. 8). A “transition” rather than a “boundary”
or a “distinction” softens the blow of separateness. The transitional object keeps alive an earlier
and deeper mode of experience and relating like a kind of fossil from previous era within the
area of external phenomena that the infant is beginning to appreciate.
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Crucially, this ego-border becomes something that is not a line, but a sort of widened inbetween area, much as the border between France and Switzerland is not a line but a quarter mile
of territory. Something of the process of seeing both “difference” but also “similarity”-- which is
to say the discovery of ego-boundaries that can function as a shared border as much as a
demarcation of difference-- is at the heart of both transitionality and attunement. In his paper
“The Mirror Role of the Mother and Family in Child Development (1967),” Winnicott highlights
the ways that face to face communication of affect give way to the infant’s feeling of being real
in relation to others. The infant looks into the mother’s face and “what the baby sees is himself
or herself (p. 151).” In Winnicott’s understanding of this mirroring, “the mother is looking at the
baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there” (italics in the original). When the
process of mirroring does not occur in the dyad, when the infant has the experience of “not
getting back what they are giving,” then what the baby instead sees is “the mother’s face.” The
infant is forced to experience a brute literalness, an outside world with no possibility of
corresponding to his inner experience. The object is totally and irrevocably outside of the egoboundary, and has nothing in common with the world inside the ego-boundary. “Perception”
then “takes the place of apperception.” An opportunity has been lost for that capacity for
“significant exchange with the world,” a “two way process in which self-enrichment alternates
with the discovery of meaning in the world of seen things.” That softening of the ego-boundary
between subject and object, like the one between psychic reality and external reality that makes
possible transitional phenomena, makes possible connection, communication and creativity. This
creates the possibility of finding a language or aesthetic experience of expression that can
communicate something of the inner core to another person, perhaps directly to that person’s
core, in a way that exact, secondary-process based language cannot (Loewald, 1976, 179).
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Without the possibility of borders rather than boundaries, and in fact wide “border areas” where
distinction is not insisted upon, the rigidly drawn ego-boundary becomes an impediment, and the
subject is forced either to withdraw inward into a world of subjective reality or to capitulate to
the not-me world, to alternate between these two, or to attempt a psychotic solution, such as the
abolishment of the ego-boundary or the de-cathexis of ego-feeling.
Therefore, if the early oral needs of the infant constitute much of what Winnicott terms
the “id-needs” of the infant, then the “ego-needs”(1960, p. 141) involve attunement psychically
cathected body parts that function as a concrete manifestation of the ego-boundaries, and whose
role in infancy came to be elaborated later. These ego-needs of the infant that must be met also
involve the ego of the caretaker, and his or her capacity for empathy, attunement, and holding in
mind a representation of the infant and his needs. In an adult such capacities may be understood
as largely “mental,” a question of what we might now term the adult’s “reflective function”
(Fonagy et al,1991), but to the infant, the needs of his own ego that are met by the adult ego are
still largely registered in and on his body and often in relation to the caregiver’s body or voice. In
the understanding of Winnicott and Anzieu, early attunement is a psychosomatic phenomenon.
Some of the more important and highly cathected body parts in this exchange are the face, the
voice and the skin. These body parts, at various moments, become a nexus for the development
of ego-feeling. As we have shown, the ego of the caregiver serves the function—responding to,
symbolizing and managing (including defensively to mitigate anxiety)—that will be internalized
and taken over more and more as the child matures, and comes to be felt as the infant’s ego. In
this sense, ego-feeling is to some extent co-created, which is to say that it is the result of the
psychosomatic collaboration of infant and caregiver, the early communications of need and
affect of the infant that are registered, communicated back and administered to by the caregiver,
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in a process that is gradually imaginatively experienced and cathected by the infant until the
entire “transitional” space between mother and infant has become internalized to some degree as
the ego.
The infant puts out a raw, proto-affect into the world, but it becomes real and meaningful
when it is returned by the caregiver’s mirroring and attunement. The infant’s affects become real,
and manageable, when he sees them reflected back in the face of a caregiver who can register
them, and then give them back to the infant. This mirroring of affects and parent-infant
attunement is an area of infant care that is available to empirical studies of parents and infants,
and has been the subject of the work of infant researchers (Stern, 1985; Tronick et al, 2018;
Beebe, Lachmann & Jaffe, 1997).
Perhaps no other psychoanalyst went as far in understanding the overlap of the motherinfant ego relationship, the body ego and the actual physical body than Didier Anzieu. Anzieu
was also the only analyst of his generation to see Federn’s relevance to contemporary theory.
Combining Freud’s notion of the psychical apparatus (1900, p. 80) and Federn’s ideas about egoboundaries, and utilizing Laplanche’s highlighting of the “propping” of mental phenomena upon
sensational experiences in Freud (1976, p. 10), Anzieu comes to see the attachment and
communication between mother and infant as taking place in a shared skin interface. The ability
of each to affect the other forms a two-way communication system, felt by the infant as a skin, a
“wrapping of messages.” Thus, the human skin, that most outer of organs, as well as the
psychical ego, the cortical and outermost part of the psyche that borders on reality, is felt as the
bodily representation of the ego-boundaries, or, in earliest life, the slowly developing ego-border
between mother and infant. Explicitly inspired by Federn, and his notion that Federn’s egoboundaries serve as “an interface” touching upon both the outer and inner worlds, Anzieu sees
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this two-way screen of communication of touch and affect becoming propped up on the physical
experiences of touch, holding, bathing and swaddling. The skin-ego therefore does for the psyche
what the skin does for the physical body, holding up, structuring, feeling what is inside and what
is outside, communicating and providing the demarcations and borders on which an identity can
be said to begin and end, as well as a relationship with another can occur. The skin-ego is
developed through the parent-infant environment. Skin-to-skin contact and touching is,
according to Anzieu, the original form of communication. In the ordinary holding and handling,
the infant continually gets the implicit message: this is your skin, the borders of your “I”. You
are an individual. Even the sounds of the mother’s voice come to lead to a “sound image of the
self,” (p.77) which the infant feels against his outer membrane of skin, and being spoken to
creates the feeling of a self that is being addressed, a self with contours. In between the period of
merger and individuation, there is a moment in which the infant feels that he and the mother have
a shared skin. After he is individuated, the infant still comes to feel that this skin contains a
remnant of the early mother-infant matrix. The “mothering environment” (p.59) comes to be felt
on the skin—an “external wrapping made up of messages” (p.77) that in an ideal circumstance
adapts flexibly to the infant, and moves with his movements. This is felt as a “tailor made
wrapping,” because “to be an Ego is to feel that one is unique” (p. 67). The attachment
experiences are thus registered on the skin so that anxious parenting comes to be felt as an overly
tight and constricting skin, while a more dissociated or lax parent comes to be felt as a sagging
skin that is not fit to the infant’s contours. The skin remains itself as a sort of transitional
phenomenon, a remnant of the deep attachment of early childhood.
Conclusion: The Three-Dimensional Psyche

89

Though emerging in several theories, from different countries and different analytic
traditions, the contributions of Winnicott, Lewin, Loewald and Anzieu take up and extend
Federn’s thinking in several important ways. All of these thinkers begin with a notion of the
etiology of ego-feeling in early infancy in the parent-infant bond. All add the notion of an egocore, a psychic center based in early experiences of satisfaction and merger with the object, the
area of the true self and the incommunicado self, in Winnicott’s understanding, the area of
primal density, in Loewald’s language, and the early internalized state of merger that makes
dreaming possible, in Lewin’s theory of the dream screen. The core of ego-feeling is therefore,
paradoxically, that which is the opposite of ego-feeling: primary process, wish-fulfilment
hallucination, merger with the object and the negation of space and time. Through the attuned
handling of this experience, the infant begins to discover the world of “not-me.” This is itself
made bearable by the handling and attunement of the caregiving environment and the beginnings
of communication between two separate beings in the touching and handling of the skin and in
the mirroring of facial gestures. The infant also carries something with him out of what Loewald
calls the “density” of the earlier stage which he imbues into a teddy bear or blanket, a
“transitional object.” Together these make possible some sense of possibility of communication
and connection of the core of the self, which would otherwise have to be not only hidden and
protected but also isolated.
These theories go a long way towards providing an etiology for Federn’s observations of
the instability of ego-feeling in his psychotic patients. But they also provide a new and updated
model of the psyche that is simultaneously topographical and structural, instinctual and
relational, one formed out of the early intersubjective world of the parent and infant but
organized around the embodied, psychosomatic experiences and object-related desires of the
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infant that are elaborated in fantasy. This three-dimensional psyche has a skin-like surface ego
with a “cortex” that shades deeper and deeper inwards towards the more unconscious and id-like
aspects of the psyche, even past the repressed unconscious to earlier and older aspects of the
psyche, and even further into the area of the incommunicado self, where self and early objects
commune and are one at the very center.
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Chapter Four: Ego-Feeling in the Analytic Situation: Two Participants in Search of a
Character

“Psychoanalysis carried out in this manner consists basically in the restoration, step by step, of
normal narcissistic cathexes of the ego; it reverses the step by step losses of narcissistic cathexes
by the schizophrenic process.”
--Paul Federn (1950 pp.118) “Psychoanalysis of Psychoses”

…Something
Ought to be written about how this affects
You when you write poetry:
The extreme austerity of an almost empty mind
Colliding with the lush, Rousseau-like foliage of its desire to communicate
Something between breaths, if only for the sake
Of others and their desire to understand you and desert you
For other centers of communication, so that understanding
May begin, and in doing so be undone.
--John Ashbery “Ut Pictura Poesis” ()

This chapter will examine the implications that Federn’s ideas, as well as the line of
thinking developed in subsequent generations that we have outlined in Chapter 3, have for
technique and for understanding clinical work. We have stated that Federn alone kept alive a
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particular, radical strain in Freud’s thinking in the subsequent generation of psychoanalysts,
particularly with regard to the lack of fixity of the ego, and that this strain was then picked up
directly by Winnicott, Lewin, Loewald and Anzieu. As we have shown, Freud’s middle period
and the introduction of the ego as a major character within the internal dramas of psychic life, led
to two radically different ways of approaching the relationship between the subject and his
productions and experiences. One is that the former creates the latter, or the thinker creates the
thoughts, and this leads to a “top down” and somewhat rationalist approach to psychoanalysis, in
which a character structure (Reich, 1933; Kernberg, 1970 )and an ego (Hartmann, 1950) is
assumed on metapsychological grounds in an adult patient, and the patient’s thoughts and
feelings and transferences are understood as productions of, and a reflection upon, the character
structure of the person who is thinking them. The second, much more radical implication, is that
the thoughts create the thinker-- that the ego and character structure is not a given but is
something that is being constantly created and maintained out of the unconscious workings and
investments and compromise formations of the subject12. No matter how rigid and fixed a
character presentation may seem to be, it is not a “structure” but a fiction that is being insisted
upon. In this sense, the thoughts create the thinker and the dream creates the dreamer. When
Winnicott calls play “the search for the self (1971, p. 53),” he can be understood in part as saying
that the play creates the player. If decoration can be a theoretical statement, then certainly
Freud’s consulting room, as seen in the Freud Museum London, with its plethora of ancient
statues and faces that creates a sort of “hall of mirrors” effect, seems almost perfectly designed to
induce the patient into an awareness of the multiplicities, fragments and the simultaneous

12

In this sense, the relational idea that meaning, and even the self-presentation of the analysand in a
psychoanalytic session is “emergent” (Ghent, 2002) comes closer to this more radical Freudian possibility than
American “classical” analysis
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existence of multiple versions of his own ego. The presentation of the patient before the analyst
is a momentary psychic creation, one of many possible egos. The patient’s use of, and sense of
the denotations and connotations of the word “I” are, as any other conscious thought or
experience, a product of a tremendous amount of unconscious dreamwork and preconscious
editing and transformation. If the patient’s ego that he presents to the world is so restricted that
out of the whole “formless infinity” (Matte Blanco, 2003; Lombardi, 2015) of his inner world he
can only predictably, and at times inappropriately, summon up one rigidly defended version of
one character, then this can be understood as a failure of the deeper “bottom-up” processes in the
creative aspects of being and living --what Ogden (2007, p. 575) calls a failure of the patient to
fully “dream himself into being.” This leads to a very different understanding of psychoanalysis
than an approach based on the idea that the ego is a fixed given that is synthesizing and
modifying the experience. In the latter, the ego is the only available and real thing the clinician
has access to, in the former, the ego is a story the patient is telling himself and others, as
overdetermined and suspect as any other.
As subsequent contributions came to show, ego-feeling comes into being out of the
instincts and impulses that are given containment and meaning through the medium of the
parent’s holding, handling, ongoing maternal preoccupation, and response to the infant’s
spontaneous gesture. But all of this implies a paradox. A caregiving environment that can allow
the infant to live in a state of primary narcissism and omnipotence—not in the world of space
and time (and the frustration implied by these)—will allow eventually for a true and stable egofeeling, a “true self”(Winnicott 1960, p. 8) organization. The more the infant is protected from
the burdens of ego-feeling in a state of un-integration, merger, omnipotence, response to his
spontaneous gesture and the external materialization of his hallucinatory wish-fulfillment
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through the caregiver’s participation, the more real, stable and true his ego-feeling will
eventually be. Ego-feeling rests upon an early foundation of something very much the opposite.
Ego-feeling therefore implies not only the experience of having boundaries, but the experience of
having a personal core, a merged, unverbalizable place at the center of one’s sense of being. In
the slow, ensuing separation, the infant comes to have his own individuated surface that is a
holding and structuring entity in his psyche and a remnant of the earlier infant-environment setup (Anzieu, 1985). This strengthened ego can own and take responsibility for its instincts and
they become a source of vitality and creativity (Winnicott, 1960), rather than a destabilizing
force that must be acted out, repressed, or projected out into the object world or denied.
We have concluded that all of this leads to a new Freudian synthesis, a different, “threedimensional” metapsychology that is simultaneously instinctual and relational, as well as
structural, topographical and developmental. This model of the psyche locates consciousness,
external perception, secondary process thinking, the “ego” as understood by mainstream ego
psychology, and Winnicott’s “false self” (1960) at the surface (though just how false and
unrecognizable this outward facing self is felt to be exists on a spectrum from health to
pathology), modeled after the psychosomatic experience of skin (Anzieu 1985), the face and the
voice, representing itself to the external world and feeling and structuring the inner world. This
outward layer or ego-boundary of the psyche is one arrived at by way of feedback, mirroring and
caregiving from the external world, an almost “transitional” (1953) remnant of the “shared skin”
across which nonverbal messages were transmitted in the early mother-infant matrix. This shades
inward into deeper and earlier ego-states, memories, wishes and object-relationships, both those
belonging to the repressed unconscious and those belonging to other aspects of the unconscious.
At the center of this is what is felt by a person to be his or her true self (Winnicott 1960),
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incommunicado self (Winnicott, 1963), primary density (Loewald, 1980), area of the dream
screen (Lewin, 1946), or in some other designation, the personal core.
Every aspect of this psyche has some relation to the object world, though of varying
degrees of maturity and separation, but the further inward one goes, the further one gets from
waking, present ego-feeling, the sense of existence in the “psychic present” (Loewald, 1962), the
reality principle, and waking, conscious existence in space and time and the external world.
All of this has implications for clinical work that range from the abstract to the practical,
from the nature of the analytic setting and therapeutic action to our understanding of analytic
boundaries, psychoanalytic listening, resistance and defense, transference and
countertransference, and interpretations of the patient’s ego-state and its fluctuations. But
perhaps the overall implication is the following: a patient has come to psychoanalysis to find,
create, or claim his core ego-feeling and to demarcate, discover or re-negotiate his egoboundaries. The transference can be understood as a way for this patient to go “back to the
drawing board” as it were, to the early and deep sources of his personal inner organization and its
relation to the external world. Within the burgeoning transference, the patient is strengthening
his ego-center by taking in something of the climate of the setting into his inner world and also
testing and discovering and rediscovering his ego-boundaries against the analyst as the real and
transference aspects of the analyst’s person are sorted out and worked through. For many
patients, this involves coming apart (regression) so they can then put themselves back together in
a way that is more in harmony with their ego-center, which may require a state of regression to
find.
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The analyst’s job is to work with the patient’s ego-feeling, with an aim towards
negotiating the ego-boundaries, making intuitive (and often silent) contact with the ego-center,
and allowing for the strengthening and connectivity of both, as well as connectivity with external
reality. This is a somewhat less insight-oriented approach to psychoanalysis. Developing insight
becomes a byproduct of being in touch. Connectivity along interpersonal and intrapsychic egoboundaries becomes a necessary condition for the capacity for insight.
In this chapter, I hope to argue for a somewhat generalized, but hopefully useful approach
to the analytic set-up, in which depth listening, regression, the narcissistic transference and the
analytic setting are geared towards the building up and making connection with the center,
whereas the frame, the surface, and resistance analysis (as well as relational interventions) and
interpretation of the conflictual transference are associated with the development or negotiation
of ego-boundaries.

Federn’s Clinical Technique with Psychosis
The chapter in Ego Psychology and the Psychoses titled “Psychoanalysis of Psychoses,”
was based in large part on the 1943 article in the Psychoanalytic Quarterly that Winnicott
referred to in his letter to Federn, although in his editing of the volume, Edoardo Weiss
combined this with an earlier paper that had been published in the International Journal of
Psychoanalysis in order to avoid redundancies (pp. 117). In it, Federn, who was arguably the
senior authority in the adaptation of psychoanalysis for psychosis at that time, gives a series of
vignettes and recommendations for both technique and management in the work of psychotic
patients.
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As far as the utility of what comes to be called a “Freudian” technical methodology to
work with disturbed patients, Federn takes a nuanced stance. On one hand, he recollects
Bleuler’s observation that Burghozli and those in his clinic could “discharge three times as many
cases since all physicians had begun to deal with them on the profound basis of more Freudian
understanding.” And yet, Federn states, “these patients weren’t really psychoanalyzed. I think
that is why they improved.” Because the treatments in the Burghozli clinic were more for
research purposes, Federn stated that he believed that the psychiatrists “adjusted themselves to
the patients, so as to get as much information as possible, and either wittingly or without being
aware of it, behaved in such a way that the schizophrenics established good positive
transferences to the physicians.” As further evidence to this point Federn notes that, with those
patients who are higher functioning but have an underlying psychosis that can be triggered in the
analysis, those practicing what he termed “pseudo-Freudian” approaches, such as Stekel, Adler,
Rank and Horney, often had better results. “Neither the true Freudian technique,” Federn wrote,
“nor the pseudo analytical measures just mentioned, are adapted to severe cases.” The aim,
Federn wrote “is not to bring about help blindly, but to treat mild and severe cases of psychosis
with a sound theory.” What had at times been done by accident or clinical intuition, Federn
argues, can instead be done on the basis of a sound theory and technique (1950, pp. 118-119).
Federn’s basic approach to technique with these patients is, not surprisingly, carried out
upon the basis of his understanding of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries. While Federn
recommends working within and gathering the transference, he understands the use of
transference in his work with psychotic patients in a very different way. Rather than being
something to be interpreted, the transference with these patients must be sustained as a kind of
space in which the patient’s ego-feeling can be recharged, with the practitioner being utilized in
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the narcissistic transference as an object that serves to help organize and re-charge the patient’s
damaged ego-feeling.
Federn’s approach also involved getting family members to participate in the patient’s
care. In general, this speaks to a kind of understanding of the work being done with these
patients as involving providing the necessary environmental support for the reclaiming of the
ego. Psychoanalysis with schizophrenic patients must ultimately involve providing a
background, positive transference that creates a therapeutic space in which the patient can regrow his or her mind—the “restoration, step by step, of the normal narcissistic cathexes,” which
constitutes “a reversal, step by step, of the schizophrenic process.” This chapter will consider
ways that Federn’s approach to both technique and theory can, and has, brought about an
understanding of the uses of the psychoanalytic setting towards the development, or redevelopment, of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries.

“Classical” and “Nonclassical” Patients

An important use of Federn’s thinking in contemporary psychoanalysis can be found in
Glen Gabbard’s book Boundaries in Psychoanalysis (2002), in which Gabbard describes
something of the analytic set-up in terms of boundaries, beginning his understanding with
Federn’s notion of ego-boundaries (p.1). Among many other important insights, this exploration
underpins his important work on boundary violations. Along similar lines, this paper will argue
that the entire set-up of an analytic treatment can be conceptualized in terms of ego-boundaries,
but also ego-feeling. The psychoanalytic set-up can perhaps be understood first and foremost as a
relaxation of certain boundaries within the frame (boundary) of the analysis, with an ultimate
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aim of utilizing transference interpretations toward re-negotiating a healthier structure of
boundaries, both intrapsychic and intrapersonal. Utilizing the foundational notions of free
association, resistance and transference (and countertransference), we can see how the patient
brings in a certain organization or deficit in ego-feeling, with damaged, merged, or shifting egoboundaries, and how these can fluctuate and shift throughout treatment and throughout a session.
The injunction to the patient on the couch-- to report what comes to mind—can itself be
understood as an injunction on the part of the patient to relax the ego-boundaries that filter, edit
and organize contents before speaking them out loud. It is also implying a different kind of egoboundary with the analyst than pertains to other relationships between adults. As this is
attempted, the analyst will begin to hear something of the patient’s deeper and earlier
preoccupations coming through. Having been given an impossible and anxiety-inducing task (to
speak aloud his mind), the patient will also erect various resistances of subtle and not-so-subtle
varieties. Here we can see the ego-boundaries at work, flinching from the anxiety-inducing
contents, becoming hardened barriers, or expanding out into the session to turn aspects of the
analyst or treatment into past internal phenomena (transference as resistance). The egoboundaries here may even encroach on the person of the analyst, utilizing transference to turn the
analyst into someone from the patient’s internal cast of characters, and therefore someone from
within (and not outside) the patient’s ego-feeling. The patient may similarly utilize the blurred
boundaries to recreate a narcissistic oneness with the analyst, or imagine some or all of his
unwanted inner contents within the analyst, as in many discussions of projective identification
(e.g Joseph, 2018). The analyst, who is hopefully registering the shifting and changing and the
encroachments upon his own ego-feeling (analytic listening or countertransference), is gradually
able to interpret some of these distortions, and in doing so to help the patient to find steadier and
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healthier ego-boundaries, both in terms of his relations to external objects and with regards to his
relationship to his inner object world.
We can see from this summary that ego-feeling can be utilized and understood with
regard to the “classical” approach to the “analyzable” patient, providing new language that may
perhaps revitalize some of the characterizations, but does not substantially change a conventional
understanding of the process. The above summary can perhaps be almost equally applied to the
relational approach, but stated in “two-person” terms and with more emphasis on the egoboundaries that touch upon the external object in the present moment—the “real
relationship”(Mitchell, 1984, p. 483) in the present--and perhaps more emphasis on a two-way
exchange between the ego-boundaries of the patient and the ego-boundaries of the analyst.
But a theory of ego-feeling around a personal core, surrounded and enveloped by layers
of ego-boundaries, also allows for a conceptualization of work with non-neurotic patients or the
non-neurotic states that may arise in an otherwise neurotic patient. In the language of Federn’s
metapsychology, the non-neurotic patient is one who has come to treatment due to an instability
of ego-feeling, a deficit or difficulty in sustaining the experience that they have a thinking,
feeling, continuous “I” that is real, whole, accessible, secure, internally connected, and that
integrates psychic and somatic experiences. Such a core deficit will often express itself as an
instability of the ego-boundaries that allow for recognition of the properties of external reality,
the experiencing of inner reality, and object-relating. The patient’s inner life, outer life, or both,
may seem nonsensical, incoherent, or empty. This is not a patient who has come to treatment
primarily because of an ego that is beleaguered by conflict between id and superego trends but
because of an ego that feels unstable or discontinuous, deadened, existentially threatened by
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persecutors, easily lost amid perceived abandonments, or like a garment that does not fit.13 While
these issues are certainly more common in non-neurotic patients, a patient with these deficits
may be high-functioning, and may not necessarily show on the surface the primitive defenses or
distorted object relations that are typically used to characterize or define these categories (e.g
Kernberg, 1970). It is the working assumption of this chapter that both deficits in the
maintenance of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries, as well as conflictual compromise formations,
are present in every patient to varying degrees, and any symptom, thought, dream, transferencecountertransference phenomenon or enactment will invariably contain both in a mutually
influencing way. Moreover, it is the assumption that every aspect of a psychic conflict has egofeeling and ego-boundaries implicated, while shifts and changes in ego-feeling and egoboundaries can often themselves be understood as the result of psychic conflict. But for a patient
who has come predominantly to try and find his own, real, stable ego-feeling with boundaries
that can meaningfully contain and register his inner life and can meaningfully touch upon reality
and the object world, including the development of the transitional space between, the argument
has often been made that a different kind of work may have to be done first.
Relatedly, in Federn’s conceptualization of the work with psychotic patients as a
“reversal, step by step of the schizophrenic process,” he may have been among the first to begin
an early exploration of the idea that the analyst’s job is not to analyze dreams, play and fantasy
but help the patient develop the capacity to dream, play and fantasize. The patient may require
active engagement and even confrontation, or an “unobtrusive,” enabling presence (Balint,
1969), but the analytic space is utilized towards building and connecting to the essentials of the

13

This is not to say that the id (including more destructive rather than erotic drive derivatives) and a harsh and
punitive superego do not play a role in the patient’s distress, but that the patient can understood to be largely
coming to treatment to find or develop their ego/self rather than free it from inhibiting conflicts.
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psyche rather than paring the psyche down to its essentials, like the classical analyst who works,
surface to depth, to undo various resistances and repressions. In Federn’s language,
psychoanalysis must at times also include moments of “psychosynthesis” (Federn, 1950, p. 118)
the building, or perhaps re-building of the psyche. Although Federn’s work with schizophrenic
patients necessitated changes in the analytic frame and technique, much of the rest of this chapter
considers the implications of these ideas with a range of patients, and particularly considers the
possibility that Federn’s “use of the transference” toward the claiming or re-claiming of egofeeling is not necessarily antithetical to classical technique.

Free Association and the Search for Ego-Feeling
The excerpt from the John Ashbery poem at the opening of the chapter, in which the
ultimate goals is for “understanding” to “begin, and in doing so be undone,” resonates with a
statement that Winnicott makes regarding the need of a patient to be able to find a “nonpurposive” state within the treatment. In the chapter of Playing and Reality called “Playing: The
Search for the Self (1971, p. 38),” Winnicott states that a certain kind of patient who has come to
analysis to try to find themselves “needs a new experience in a specialized setting.” This
experience is “one of a non-purposive state…a sort of ticking over of the unintegrated
personality.” The adult patient who is free associating, or the child playing on the floor “must be
allowed to communicate a succession of ideas, thoughts, impulses and sensations that are not
linked except in some way that is neurological or physiological and perhaps beyond detection”
(p. 116). It is only where there is “purpose” and therefore “anxiety” and where there is “lack of
trust based on the need for defense” that the analyst will be able to point out the connections. For
those of us taught to follow the process and the “thread” underlying a patient’s associations, this

103

is a somewhat startling line of thinking. But Winnicott seems to be saying that there are moments
where the patient and the analyst must both be willing to set aside the thread entirely.
This chapter suggests the possibility that the thread connecting the patient’s associations
is actually related to ego-feeling. Federn states that ego-feeling is can be defined as the sense of
an “uninterrupted unity” in the “feeling of bodily and mental relations in respect to time and
content” (1926, p. 25).” Free association or play involves a relaxation of ego-feeling. But what
emerges is often a more preconscious ego-feeling, a kind of thread of underlying coherence that
connects the patient’s seemingly disconnected associations. This paper hypothesizes that this
preconscious thread that the analyst can observe underlying the patient’s associations is closely
related to the feeling of continuity that a person with stable ego-feeling takes for granted in his
daily life. No matter how much the synthesizing functions and secondary process are relaxed,
there is still some degree of a thread to the associations. But as we have explored in the previous
chapter, the basis of ego-feeling rests in the early experiences of unintegration, merger and
hallucinatory wish-fulfillment. For a patient utilizing the analytic setting to find his center, he
must be allowed to lose his ego-feeling, eventually daring to allow himself to lose the associative
thread in the hopes of finding within himself the state out of which a more comfortable and
personally representative ego-feeling will arise. This implies a kind of radical trust that is surely
not achieved quickly or easily, even with a patient who has a relatively benign transference and
easily takes to the process. Only if the patient and the analyst are able to allow for discontinuity
without forcing a narrative can a more real and full continuity ultimate be arrived at.

Narcissism in the Structure of the Transference
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This subtitle is a play on Federn’s paper “Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego” (1950),
with the implication that something of this idea can carry over into our understanding of
transference—particularly that “background” aspect of the transference in which the patient uses
the setting, regularity and analyst in order to bolster, constitute and structure his ego. Much in
line with Federn’s recommendations for the treatment of psychotic patients, several analysts
have argued that there is a level of the transference in which all patients-- but especially those
with narcissistic deficits-- can use the transference in order to make such an investment in
themselves. This kind of use occurs in action and in the frame and set-up. Apart from having a
conflictual whole-object transference relationship with their analyst, the patient may also be
using the setting, the regularity of session times, and the unobtrusive presence of the analyst to
constitute themselves. Winnicott wrote of the patient who tells the analyst everything that
happened chronologically and in detail(1945, p. 150), and says that though the analyst may feel
that nothing has happened, the patient has in fact used the session and the analyst to gather the
bits and pieces of his or her experience together and thus achieving some degree of integration.
While seemingly not doing the work of analysis, a patient may be discovering and playing with
integration, presence and absence and utilizing the transference as a way to feel real or to build
up the structure of their ego. In my own work, I have found patients may even symbolize this
usage of me. Two patients who seemed to use their psychotherapy in this particular way were the
only two patients who regularly used the electrical outlet in the therapy room to charge their cell
phones, as if symbolizing their use of the therapeutic setting as a way of being plugged into
something that could recharge their own ego.
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Sheldon Bach (2016) has differentiated between two different levels of transference with
a patient. Referencing Treurniet, who calls these “foreground” and “background” transferences,
Bach describes them in the following way:
The one transference, sometimes called primordial, basic, narcissistic, or background
transference, is a transference to the analyst as the environmental mother, that is, to the analyst as
primarily a function for holding and containing rather than as a person to be related to…This
basic transference is largely preconscious or unconscious and handled through management,
although it may become an object for analytic examination early on if trust is lacking, or later on
as the analysis proceeds.
The other type of transference, sometimes called classic, neurotic, object-related,
Oedipal, or iconic transference, is to the analyst as a partial or whole object who is being related
to in some psycho-dynamic way, on both conscious and unconscious levels. (p. 39)
Bach goes on to state how, for some patients with early deficits—or what we may call deficits in
ego-feeling—the background level of the transference is the area in which the most work is to be
done. Bela Grunberger (1991) makes a similar argument. Arguing that narcissism and what he
terms a “narcissistic regression” are “built into the transference,” he later adds that the
conflictual transference is in fact far less unique to the psychoanalytic situation than the
narcissistic regression. “People have a transference to their cardiologist, to their milk man, to
their caretaker of a block of flats,” he writes. While adding that the analytic situation does create
a “laboratory” where such phenomena are studied, he nevertheless adds that “the analytic
coordinates, more than anything else, set in motion the narcissistic aspects of the psyche (p.
221).” These phenomena are built into the structure of the treatment, and the analyst need do
very little other than set up the space and a presence that the patient can make use of in this way.
However, an analyst may, in the name of “proper technique” get in the way of this patient’s use
of the set-up, by misinterpreting the patient’s use of the treatment and by insisting on
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prematurely interpreting what the patient is doing in the terms of a higher-level transference in
which the analyst is represented as an object and the patient is doing something to the analyst.
The analyst can thus allow the patient to use the analytic set-up towards integration and
growth, to reactivate the early ego-states and object relations of the phase in which individual
ego-feeling was being discovered. This way of working has often been confused with a
“corrective emotional experience” (Alexander, 1950) when, I hope to argue, the analysts who
work in this way are working from a different premise, that of using the presence and often
nonverbal aspects of the treatment towards helping the patient achieve psychic development and
integration, rather than the idea that the analyst functions as a corrective or new object, which
would still imply something more in the realm of a whole-object, conflictual, interpersonal
relationship than this understanding which works more around the assumption of a regression to
primary narcissism where self and object are not fully differentiated.
This paper argues that this most basic level of the transference, which Bach and
Grunberger write about, is what Federn first gestured at in his recommendation that the analyst
maintain an unchallenged positive transference with psychotic patients, with the goal of helping
the patient to re-cathect his ego-feeling. Federn’s recommendation can be understood as the
beginning of an understanding of the role of management and provision from the environment in
setting up the conditions and relationship in which a patient can begin to discover—or rediscover—his own ego.

Regression
By the 1950’s and 1960’s, Federn’s influence could be seen in a particular kind of
approach to regression, an approach that was developed simultaneously in the work of Winnicott
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in London and that of Bertam Lewin and Otto Isakower in New York. Winnicott’s (1955) focus
was more on regression to an early developmental state, Lewin’s (1955) focus was more on the
topographical regression to a dream-like state, and Isakower’s primary contribution is to a
corresponding regression that occurs in the mind of the listening analyst (1992) in order for
unconscious communication to occur. As in his descriptions of hypnagogic phenomena, the
analytic set-up can become a space in which, in Isakower’s phrase, “lost objects and submerged
worlds” (1938, p. 345) may be conjured up, and, in Winnicott’s sense, the original primary
narcissism, in which the “the environment is holding the individual, and at the same time the
individual knows of no environment and is at one with it” (1955, p. 283), can be evoked.
In the “Metapsychological and Clinical Aspects of Regression within the PsychoAnalytic Set-Up” (1955), Winnicott explores the role of regression in patients for whom early
environmental failure had interfered with ego-development. Winnicott states that “Freud takes
for granted the early mothering situation and my contention is that it turned up in his provision of
a setting for his work, almost without his being aware of what he was doing (p. 284).” Winnicott
makes the case for a technical approach that allows for the patient’s inner regressive pull. Among
his main theses, he lists the following:
Psychotic illness is related to environmental failure at an early stage of the
emotional development of the individual. The sense of futility and unreality belongs
to the development of a false self which develops in protection of the true self.
The setting of analysis reproduces the early and earliest mothering techniques. It
invites regression by reason of its reliability. The regression of a patient is an
organized return to early dependence or double dependence. The patient and the
setting merge into the original success situation of primary narcissism. (p. 286)
In doing so, he shows how the dyadic precursor of ego-feeling in early development
(primary narcissism) finds its direct correlates within the analytic setting. The patient
regresses to the psychic developmental stage which precedes, and forms the origin of, ego-
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feeling. Here we can see a distinct similarity to Federn’s idea of reversal of the
schizophrenic process, only for Winnicott the breakdown that is being reversed is a reexperiencing of an earlier breakdown.
For Lewin, the regression evoked is topographical, rather than developmental, but
through the lens of ego-feeling there is not very much distinction. In Federn’s
understanding, a “regression,” can perhaps be correlated to a change in the egoboundaries. This notion bridges the developmental and topographical aspects of
regression; as the ego-boundaries are pulled inwards or loosened and the preconscious and
unconscious contents come closer to the surface, and thinking takes on more elements of
the primary process, earlier psychic states and object relations can be evoked.
Reminding the readers of the early beginnings of psychoanalysis in hypnosis, with its
evocation of a hypnoid state in the patient, Lewin (1955) compares the state of the patient’s free
association with the state of a person dreaming. As in Winnicott, Bach and Grunberger, this level
of the transference does not involve treating the analyst as a whole person and the object of
various conflicts. The analyst that is being made use of in this way is “not a unitary element that
can be directly mapped to a unitary spot in the diagram of the psychic apparatus and into the
psychology of sleep and the dream,” and, in fact, as Lewin writes, the analyst belongs in several
places in the diagram, also 'around' the diagram, and that he can be mapped in terms
of dream psychology as a day residue, as an external excitant, and as an external or 'border'
soother (p. 285).” Italics here are added to stress the extent to which the job of the analyst in
such a regressive situation may be to hold onto the ego-boundaries that border on reality for the
patient so that that the patient can regress. By being able to have enough of an inner regression
that he himself can be on the patient’s wavelength but simultaneously being able to keep track of
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reality, and “wake the patient up” at the end of the session, the analyst has become, in Freud’s
phrase about the dream itself, “the guardian of sleep” (Freud, 1900, p. 411) an auxiliary egoboundary that allows the patient to regress without having to mind reality. The analyst is placed,
as Lewin writes, “on the border of the dream” (p. 285). But the vague presence or figure of the
analyst is also noted in other places on the “diagram,” as the analyst may be the spirit of sleep,
the site of sleep, or be associated with the warmth and comfort of sleep.
Lewin saw the developments in American psychoanalysis in the time he was writing as a
part of a movement that gradually shifted more and more only toward the waking aspects of the
patient’s experience. “Gradually,” he wrote, “since the beginnings of analysis in hypnotism, we
got away more and more from the sleeping or partly asleep patient, and we rejected a good deal
of the technique that depended on the patient's partial sleep. It is worth examining whether, along
with this rational development, we may not have erected an unconscious defense as well (p.
241).” In Federn’s understanding, the focus on the “waking” aspects has to do with negotiating
the ego-boundaries, while the “asleep” aspects have to do with a kind of connection between the
analyst and patient at the core of the respective ego-feeling of each, as will be further discussed
in the work of Isakower.
Lewin describes a number of symptoms, behaviors and dreams on the part of the patient
that show the ways that the patient is making use of an understanding of the analytic setting as
associated with a space of sleep and dreaming. Lewin seems to verge on saying that this set-up
and practice on the part of the patient is itself mutative; he does not mention any interpretations
that are made. In Federn’s terminology, the patient is developing conscious awareness of the
lower ego-boundary that touches upon the more preconscious and unconscious aspects of the
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mind. This contact, a friction that leads to dreaming, is also an important foundation for the
continuity and stability of ego-feeling. “As long as the sleeper dreams,” Federn writes, “he feels
his ego” (1926b p.76). Anzieu discusses this very phenomenon in terms of the skin ego, and the
function of the dream at night to repair the narcissistic injuries sustained during waking life.
“The dream has the function, amongst others, of trying to repair the skin ego, not only on
account of the danger the latter runs of coming apart during sleep, but principally because it has
been to some extent riddled with holes caused by the encroachments upon it during the waking
hours(1985 p. 238).” The capacity to dream, and the corresponding experience of free
association within the analytic setting allows for the steady stream of primary process and
dream-thoughts to make contact with the ego-boundaries and, therefore, becomes a means of
allowing the patient to fully feel his ego, or to integrate, repair or re-cathect his ego-feeling.
Center to Center Communication: The Analytic Instrument
Otto Isakower presents the most continuous, but also the most mysterious, link from
Federn to later generations of psychoanalysts. Isakower is the most continuous link, because he
was the only pupil and analysand of Federn’s who was not marginalized in postwar American
psychoanalysis. Isakower was analyzed by Federn in Vienna before becoming a training analyst
in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Brown, 2013, p. 28). At the same time, Isakower’s
influence is mysterious because he wrote and published very little, and his ideas are largely
known through a few recorded lectures and the recollections of his students and colleagues. Our
main interest here will be in Isakower’s focus on the process that occurs in the mind of the
listening analyst and the nature of the unconscious communications between patient and analyst.
In this sense, something of Federn’s approach came, through Isakower’s work as an educator,
into American psychoanalysis. Although his ideas were well outside the mainstream of postwar
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analytic thinking, Isakower was influential within the education and politics of the New York
Psychoanalytic Institute.
During a period when the ego and its defenses were the main focus of theorizing,
Isakower remained an unabashed depth psychologist. His main focus was on the most mysterious
aspect of Freud’s writings on technique—the way that the analyst, by means of contact with his
own unconscious processes, is able to register something from the patient’s unconscious.
Isakower seemed in many ways to significantly predict contemporary ideas in his focus on the
“analytic instrument” as a two-person process. It is perhaps for this reason that Lawrence Brown
has described Isakower as an “unsung pioneer in the evolution of an intersubjective perspective
on the analytic dyad (2013, p. 37).” For our purposes, Isakower may be the purest example of
what a Federnian approach to analytic listening (an area Federn’s own writings do not touch
upon) would look like. Aside from earlier papers on hypnagogic phenomena, Isakower’s theory
is predominantly only explicated in an issue of The Journal of Clinical Psychoanalysis (1992),
where several of his talks and lectures from the late 1950s and early 1960s were published along
with contemporary commentaries.
Isakower’s main contribution to technique was around something that he called “the
analytic instrument (1992, p. 184).” By this he meant an unconscious aspect of the analyst that
resonates with something from the patient’s unconscious, much like the phenomenon musicians
call “sympathetic vibration” when, for instance, sounding a D-string on cello will vibrate with
the D on a piano as if someone had played it. The analytic instrument only occurs in the meeting
of analyst and analysand, as something in the analyst is “in rapport with its counterpart in the
patient,” with the analytic instrument functioning as “two complementary halves” (p. 201). Like
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a pair of two transistor radios, the analytic instrument is meaningless outside of its existence in a
pair.
The analogous process of the patient’s free association and the analyst’s internal free
association create a kind of sympathetic vibration that is registered by the analyst. Drawing
together Freud’s discussions of evenly hovering attention, and his description of consciousness
in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) as “a sense organ for the perception of psychic qualities”
with both an outward facing surface and an inward facing surface, Isakower, although
“admittedly vague,” states that this analytical instrument is “the tool of the analyst.” Saying that
he discourages supervisees from “typing” (i.e labeling a patient as an obsessional or a borderline,
for instance), or even from getting too far ahead of the patient so that the supervisee analyst has
his mind full of insights that he does not yet feel the patient can hear, Isakower recommends the
encouragement of a supervisee to stay as close to the patient’s communications as possible, in
order to allow his analytic instrument to register something (p. 190). As part of these same
lectures, Isakower presents case material from one of his supervisions, in which the supervisee
shares his own association to something the patient has produced, associating the way a patient
described a smile to the Mona Lisa, which then led the patient to describe paintings by ToulouseLautrec, which he imagined to be “dead women”(p. 213). This kind of disclosure of the analyst’s
association was quite controversial at this time.
Isakower’s notion of the analytic instrument is not well known outside of the New York
Psychoanalytic Institute. And even there, it was influential to generations of analysts, including
William Grossman (1992, p. 261), Henry Zvi Lothane (1992, p. 246), Theodore Jacobs (1992, p.
237), and many others, but also a source of some confusion. The term was vague and difficult to
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define, a strange choice of words, and very difficult to reconcile with the structural model or any
ideas about metapsychology that were in broad usage.
One senses that, for Isakower, his difficulty in communicating his ideas, including a near
total lack of written record, may be related to his understanding of the clinical process. More
than most practitioners of the “talking cure” Isakower seemed distrustful of discursive language.
Isakower stressed (in a way that he admits to have been “exaggerated” in his talk) that his
supervisees must stop putting so much mental energy into conceptualizing the patient and instead
try to register the patient with his own unconscious, even if in thought fragments, images, or an
understanding that is not entirely verbalizable. The words that do come are then spontaneous,
laden with the resonances between the unconscious of analyst and analysand. But to Isakower,
these words are themselves somewhat mysterious emanations. They are the result of an
unconscious intuition, rather than the result of proper technique or an objective or conceptual
understanding, as much as these might also guide and bolster the analyst in his work.
Isakower’s talks were met more often than not with confusion, which seemed particularly
frustrating to Isakower, who was known to be abrasive (Wyman & Rittenberg, 1992, p. 167).
During a scientific meeting when the talks were presented, Isakower insisted that the analyzing
instrument was not a “metaphor” but an “entity.” Even those who valued his ideas found some
need to try and explain or translate them. Robert Bak suggested at the talk that perhaps Isakower
meant an “ideal,” while in a later paper, Spencer, Balter and Lothane prefer the term “model”
(1992, p. 250). They also attempted to bring his ideas in line with the language of egopsychology, while retaining the intersubjective dimension of Isakower’s thinking, and thus
describing the analytic instrument as follows: “The analyzing instrument has two constituents: a
voluntary and controlled, situation-specific and goal-specific regressed state of mind in the
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analysand and a near-identical one of the same nature in the analyst. These parts function
together through mutually evocative communication, leading to the elucidation of the
analysand's unconscious fantasy-memory constellations (1980, p. 474).” Surprisingly, nobody
has yet made the argument that the difficulty in attempting to translate Isakower’s ideas into the
language of ego psychology—as well as the reason he may have felt so misunderstood-- is that
Isakower was speaking from a different ego psychology. This chapter argues that Isakower never
abandoned the ego psychology of his analyst and mentor, Paul Federn.
Henry Zvi Lothane, a student of Isakower’s, has suggested (1994) that Isakower’s
description of the ego-state involved in self-observation in his paper “Self-Observation, SelfExperimentation and Creative Vision (1945),” corresponds to the state of mind of the analyst that
forms part of Isakower’s understanding of the analytic instrument:
For the scientific investigation of processes going on in one's self, it is a prerequisite that the
subject be able to put himself into a state very much akin to that between sleep and waking, to
remain in that state, and to let the apparatuses of his ego become active.… this state between
waking and sleep entails of necessity the observation on one part of the ego by another, as
conditioned by the phenomena of disintegration of the ego, which is peculiar to the process of
falling asleep. … we find the investigator absorbed in systematically induced self-observation,
apparently, wide awake, yet deeply submerged “in himself”… (p. 459)
This description seems directly related to Federn’s observations (1926b) on the changes in egofeeling that occur around sleep and dreaming. However, there is one exception-- the attention
cathexes associated with consciousness remain active. It seems that Isakower is describing the
state of becoming conscious of one’s ego-feeling. To be conscious of one’s ego-feeling is also to
be separate from it, looking on as an observer. As this occurs, there is a loosening of egoboundaries, and the ego-state is allowed to regress. The analyst or patient in this state is very
near able to observe himself, while awake, in a near sleeping state.

115

Loewald has stated that, with certain uses of language, such as in schizophrenic speech or
modern poetry, “what we call dynamically unconscious processes can be compatible with
conscious awareness and verbalization, as though there were a direct leap from primary process
to conscious awareness, omitting preconscious secondary process mediation” (1978, p. 179).
And yet, with Isakower’s idea of the analytic instrument, there seems to be very nearly a “direct
leap” from the primary process of the patient to that of the analyst. The contact (ego-boundary)
between the patient’s free association and the analyst’s analogous internal process produces a
kind of friction or resonance that the analyst is able to register. Because the analyst’s conscious
awareness is outside of ego-feeling, he can register and think about the effect of this resonance
within the area of ego-feeling. Were the analyst to experience such primary process disruptions
from within his ego-feeling, they would likely be registered as either dreams or, if he
experienced them while awake, psychotic experiences. Because a part of himself remains awake,
he is able to observe the regressed sleeping part without confusing the experiences with reality.
In a resemblance to Winnicott’s evocations of the mother-infant dyad working together to
symbolize a thought, Isakower’s two-person-thinking-as-one model shows the radical
intersubjective potentialities that exist within Federn’s model of the ego, as the ego-borders
soften or merge, and “I-feeling,” can very nearly shade into “we-feeling.” In Isakower’s
understanding, the analyst eventually emerges from these moments in order to produce an
interpretation or association. But the resonances of the analytic instrument seem to bypass the
ego-boundaries and speak directly from one psychic core to another. This kind of regression
within the analytic set-up is therefore both the means by which unconscious processes are
discovered, as well as an end in themselves—a way for the patient to re-discover, and re-cathect,
and perhaps to make more sturdy, the foundations of his ego-feeling.
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Defense, Resistance and Ego-Feeling
Perhaps not enough has been said up to this point about the relationship between egofeeling and psychic conflict (Waelder, 1936; Brenner, 1984), a topic that could itself be an entire
chapter. If we can be permitted to make a generalization, we can say the following: that to the
extent that a person has achieved what Winnicott terms “unit status” (1955, p. 17), or what
Federn might term stable ego-feeling--meaning they feel themselves to be a whole, stable, and
individuated person, a person with continuous and stable ego-feeling and stable ego-boundaries-then the quality of the patient’s ego-feeling in a given moment, the moment-to-moment shifts,
and the more stable characterological traits, are most usefully understood as a result of a
compromise formation. To the extent that this is not the case, then the maintenance of an egofeeling that is felt to be precarious, or even the recovery of an ego-feeling that has already been
lost and perhaps could become lost again, becomes the primary driving force in the patient’s
mental activities and compromise formations. Even the sexual or aggressive drive derivatives
may be understood as having a secondary function to their primary purpose, which would be
allowing the patient to repair his narcissism or to feel his ego.
Expanding beyond Anna Freud’s definition of defense by the nature of the activity A.
Freud, 1936, p. 7), Brenner defined defense activities by their purpose—which is to say that any
psychic activity whose purpose is in part to mitigate negative affect can be said to have a
defensive function. Nothing is ever just a defense, and everything has some degree of defense in
it (1984, p. 72). But with Federn’s contribution we can add an understanding of defense that is
not only functional but phenomenological. The ego cannot change psychic reality, nor can it
change external reality. It can only change itself in order to distort the incoming perceptions
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before they reach consciousness and thus decrease negative affect. The ego is able to change
itself in order by producing a change in the ego-feeling and ego-boundaries. The ego distorts the
negative affect-inducing contents by changing its shape or otherwise distorting itself. In the face
of an internal or external reality that cannot be omnipotently controlled, one can only alter the
picture through altering the perceiving lens. The more primitive the defense, the greater the
change in ego-feeling. The patient who engages in splitting may have a subjective ego-feeling
(or may be registered by the analyst) as literally split in two, and the patient who engages in
projection and denial of internal reality may truly feel himself to have no inner world, and see his
psychic contents as external. The patient who engages in denial of elements of external reality is
shutting off entire areas of his ego-boundaries that register the world. The patient who engages in
higher level defenses nevertheless achieves them through some change or distortion of the
quality of ego-feeling or ego-boundaries. The more obsessional patient who intellectualizes and
values only concrete, rational and logical approaches to internal and external phenomena has to
some extent anaesthetized the ego-boundaries’ ability to feel and intuit. This understanding of
the defenses can have an important role in shaping our way of working with resistance and
defense. It can allow us to approach defense analysis in a way that is more imaginative and open.
We can “feel” the quality of the patient’s ego, perhaps with our own analytic instrument, and we
can talk about the patient as putting up walls, as hiding, as anaesthetizing or numbing, as feeling
split in two, as disappearing or running away. The defense comes to be something that is “felt”
rather than pointed out. Often, in doing this, the defensive activity comes alive with a story and a
history from the patient’s memories and inner life. Before a patient may be ready to have his
defenses challenged, he may be able to hear the analyst’s registering and reflecting back
something about psychic state in which he lives, much of which has been shaped by his defenses.
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Interpreting Shifts in Ego-Feeling
Federn’s work on ego-feeling in dreams (1932), suggests that changes in ego-feeling and
ego-boundaries influence the form and nature of dreaming, but also that a representation of the
ego and ego-feeling may be available within the dream content. This was available in one of
Federn’s early papers from before he had even come to write about ego-feeling or bodily egofeeling, in which he discusses the body ego-states represented in flying dreams. One important
usage of Federn’s ideas is that, like in dreams, we can hear and interpret shifts in ego-feeling
within session material.
While working in a hospital program for at-risk mothers and young children, I was
working with Max, a three year-old boy who was being raised by a mother who was frequently
in a state of psychotic depression. In response to an overwhelming lack of differentiation from
his mother, Max would openly dissociate, rolling his eyes upwards and seeming to be mentally
absent from the room. In my first session working with them, Max, at meeting an unfamiliar
stranger, dissociated, rolling his eyes upwards and staring off at the corner of the ceiling. “Come
back,” his mother said, brusquely, snapping her fingers in front of his face, which did little to
bring Max back. Shortly after, I said out loud, “I wonder where Max went.” Max came out of his
dissociated state and looked at me. A few minutes later, as he was playing with some toys, I
heard him say to himself “I wonder where Max went.” In several months of working with him,
he did not dissociate like that again. Here we can see that a shift in ego-feeling can be interpreted
and be made available to conscious thinking, even in a very young patient.
It is therefore my contention that something about the state of the patient’s ego-feeling
can be felt by the analyst and interpreted to the patient. This can be seen as a defense
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interpretation or as a mirroring of the patient’s ego-state. Simply pointing out to the patient the
change in state was enough to make an impact. Following these interpretations we can see a shift
in the patient’s insight or engagement.

Ego- Feeling in the Countertransference
This paper posits that shifts in ego-feeling and ego-boundaries can be experienced by the
therapist or analyst as countertransference phenomena. In Harold Searles’(1986) description of
his work with borderline patients, he begins his understanding of the difficulties these patients
experience with, he describes them in the following way:
The borderline adult, upon entering psychoanalytic therapy, functions in a manner which
indicates that he has not come as yet to experience himself as a single, whole, human individual,
capable of relating to the therapist as being another, essentially similar, individual. (pp. 47)
He also describes such patients as having difficulties with “ego integration,” as well as “ego
differentiation,” which seem, in context, synonymous with ego-feeling and ego-boundaries:
The ways in which the borderline patient manifests his difficulties with ego-differentiation are
fascinatingly subtle…Typically, it is only after several to many months of therapy that we begin
to see how pervasively unable he is to differentiate, at a more than superficial level, between
nocturnal dreams or daytime fantasies on the one hand, and perceptions of outer reality on the
other hand; between memories of the past and perceptions of the present; between emotions and
physical sensations; between thoughts (and/or feelings) and behavioral actions; between
symbolic and concrete levels of meaning in communications; between himself and the other
person; between himself and the whole outer world; between human and nonhuman, animate and
inanimate, ingredients of the outer world; and so on. (pp. 68)
Though Searles is writing this in the context of his work with borderline patients, it is the
working assumption of this chapter that this is generally true of all patients to varying degrees at
different moments—that what at first might be taken for granted as sturdy ego-boundaries
demarcating these distinctions can not in fact be taken for granted.
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This particular understanding of the ego-states in Searles’ patients directly informs his
understanding of countertransference. In a statement highly reminiscent of Isakower’s analytic
instrument, Searles writes that
So much of the borderline patient's ego-functioning is at a symbiotic, pre-individuation level
that, very frequently, it is the analyst who, through his own relatively ready access to his own
unconscious experiences, is first able to feel in awareness, and conceptualize and verbally
articulate, the patient's still-unconscious conflicts. Though these conflicts inherently "belong" to
the patient, they can come to be known to and integrated by him only through his identification
with the analyst into whom they have been able to flow, as it were, through the liquidly
symbiotic transference (pp. 191).
Such a patient (and again, a “borderline” patient is just one instance of this), Searles seems to
suggest, brings powerful affects, conflicts and fantasies that are outside of the patient’s egofeeling. Simultaneously, the lack of solid ego-boundaries on the part of the patient (“symbiotic,
pre-individuation level” functioning) leads to a situation in which the analyst is left to feel and
manage some of these contents. It is perhaps no coincidence that the term “projective
identification” was first coined not by a Kleinian, but by Federn’s analysand and pupil, Edoardo
Weiss (Greenberg, 2018). Such a concept contains within it a notion of unstable or merged egoboundaries. And if we take Isakower’s ideas seriously, such a process is more or less the basis of
all psychoanalytic listening, although with borderline or psychotic patients there may be more of
a need to contain the massive flood of material rather than simply to register it beneath the
surface.
But if the “background level” of the transference may be one that the patient utilizes to
find or integrate his ego-feeling, and the “conflictual” level of the transference may be one in
which he discovers his ego-boundaries, and the regression in the analytic set-up (as well as some
of the unstable ego-boundaries that have brought the patient in to therapy) may lead to the
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“analytic instrument” of the analyst resonating (if not being in danger of being overwhelmed),
the analyst may feel some fluctuations in his own ego-feeling or ego-boundaries as a
countertransference phenomenon that may be instructive as to the treatment of the patient. In
fact, the argument could perhaps be made that all countertransference reactions are in fact the
registering of a shift in our ego-feeling or ego-boundaries, resulting from something that is
happening between patient and analyst. Countertransference is often distinguished (to the extent
that it can be) from other thoughts, feelings or actions on the part of the analyst by saying that it
involves one the analyst feeling or acting in a way that the analyst feels to be not like
themselves—in other words, that there has been some form of a shift in the analyst’s ego-feeling,
as a result, at least in part, from a psychological pressure from the patient.
Much of an analyst’s countertransference response can therefore be attended to through
an analyst’s awareness of his own ego-feeling and its fluctuations. Subtle moments of
depersonalization can let one in on the ways in which the patient is affecting us. Once, in
conducting an intake with a young adult with an eating disorder and a history of sexual abuse, as
I took a history and inquired into her current symptoms, I had to stop myself from saying “you
should really talk to a therapist about all of this.” Overwhelmed by the level of trauma and selfdestructive acting out, I myself had become momentarily de-cathected as the therapist,
depersonalized. There were of course further resonances with her history—as the therapist who
in that moment was absent in my role as her therapist, I had become like her parents who had not
protected her from sexual abuse. I am offering the idea that fluctuations in the analyst’s egofeeling can be understood as the beeping of the analytic-instrument sonar, saying that there is
something to pay attention to, and that these fluctuations are often experienced by the analyst as
a “countertransference.”
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During a psychotherapy with Michael, a 10 year old boy with oppositional defiant
disorder and some narcissistic features, he had constructed an elaborate pretend story in which he
was a famous actor and celebrity with unlimited wealth, as well as powers which came from a
magic wand that he called a “Pennywise wand” (he had just been terrified by the movie “It,” and
in an identification with the aggressor took it on as his own power) which would make him
powerful but would also make him do evil things. I was his trusty manager Sam, who took care
of his multiple houses and cars and arranged things for him, but sometimes I was Sam’s envious
evil twin, Harry, who wanted to destroy the famous Michael and take all of his money. In one
session, Harry had put several bombs in the famous Michael’s Hollywood mansion. He and I
escaped into his private jet, only to find out that Harry was the pilot. My patient used his
Pennywise wand to throw Harry out of the plane, only to realize that he had thrown out the
wrong twin, ejecting the good Sam and not the evil Harry from the plane. As we discussed
“Sam” as someone who was dead on the ground and miles below us, I felt a kind of
lightheadedness. I had never referred myself before in the third person, much less in the past
tense as someone who was dead. It was a feeling of depersonalization. Perhaps as a way of
putting myself back together as much as interpreting the patient’s splitting, I said, in my best evil
Harry voice, “Sam and I share the same body. Just like how you turn evil when you pick up the
Pennywise wand. So you will never be rid of me.” He then picked up his Pennywise wand and,
speaking as Pennywise, said “Michael told me he doesn’t want to see Sam anymore, because he
thinks he’s so smart, but really he just cries like a little baby.” To this I responded, “Well,
Pennywise, you can tell Michael he doesn’t always have to like me.”
Following this session was a noticeable shift in Michael’s functioning, after several
sessions spent dealing with the fallout from my interpretation. Michael soon stopped going to the
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principal’s office in school and began to make friends. I offer this session as an illustration of
how my own ego-feeling shifted in the countertransference, evoking a feeling of
depersonalization that was likely a correspondent to the patient’s own early experiences of being
annihilated, or in Federn’s language the “shock” of having lost his ego-feeling, and to the false
personality that was often provocative and grandiose and identified with bad or frightening
objects that he had to show to the world, but that was “not him,” as well as his splitting and his
fear of confusing the hated with the loved aspects in his destructiveness. In taking up the
“Pennywise wand” and speaking from his evil side, Michael shared his angry feelings toward me
that he could not allow into his area of ego-feeling. But I also believe that my own feeling of
depersonalization unconsciously alerted me to the fact that it was time to make an interpretation.
Even though I had known for a long time before this about the patient’s splitting and depressive
anxieties, it was only when I had felt them in the countertransference as a threat to the integrity
of my own ego-feeling that I was able to say something within the language of our shared play
that could reach him.
Conclusion
The psychoanalytic setting can therefore be understood along the lines of Federn’s
theorizing and the contributions of subsequent analysts such as Winnicott, Lewin, Isakower,
Bach, Grunberger and Gabbard as a space where ego-feeling is sustained via the transference,
and where ego-boundaries are able to be tested, played with and fortified in a frame where
regression and free association allow for the patient to find the underlying unconscious processes
that not only may be the storage place of early wishes and conflicts but may also create and
sustain ego-feeling. This kind of work may come to the forefront in the treatment of a patient for
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whom ego-feeling is a going concern, and may have to be done for a significant period of time
before a more exploratory phase of analysis can occur, but in all patients, it forms the foundation
for exploration of conflict, the conditions for the possibility of free association, spontaneity and
connectivity that comprise the hallmarks of psychoanalytic work. Many different analytic
approaches can be understood or organized along the lines of either dealing with the narcissistic
or background level of the transference, in which deep listening and regression allows the patient
to connect to his center (and allows the analyst and the patient to engage in the center-to-center
communication described by Isakower), and the regularity of the set-up and listening presence
allows for the re-cathexis of ego-feeling. Meanwhile, the patient is testing out the differences
between transference and real object, reality and fantasy, internal and external, via the conflictual
transference, as resistance or defense analysis, the frame, and relational interventions work to
help the patient to negotiate—or re-negotiate—his ego-boundaries.
Outside of the many uses of the concept of ego-feeling and ego-boundaries in clinical
psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy, the general picture may well be that it captures
something of what makes the psychoanalytic set-up so profound and unique. In this
understanding, Freud’s clinical legacy lies not in a specific “procedure” or any of the trappings
of psychoanalysis, but in a completely novel way for two human beings to be in a room together,
one that verges on the depth and intimacy of a solitary person’s internal monologue. Another
way of saying this is that the ego-feeling or self-rapport a person has in their inner monologue is
transformed into a two-person situation via regression and transference, in the hopes that this
will eventually be re-internalized into a different kind of internal set of relationships, a different
kind of ego-feeling. Loosening the boundaries of the ego, allowing a move towards sleep, and
yet speaking this experience aloud to a “doctor” who listens in an analogous state with his whole

125

mind—surely, even after more than a century and a quarter, something of the sheer originality
and strangeness of this set-up should still be apparent to us. With Federn’s notions of ego-feeling
and ego-boundaries, we can perhaps organize and better appreciate something of the nature and
potential of this strange and specific relationship.
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